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FOREWORD
Dr G. D. Woods.
Director, Criminal Law Division,
NS.W. Department of Attorney-Generaland Justice.
If one takes the view. that the law is what actually happens in the
courts, then clearly the rules about what material may be used in the
proof of criminal charges are just as important — if not even more so —
than the deﬁnitions of criminal offences. The papers and discussion re-
ported in this volume represent a continuation of the professional and
academic debate about the rules of criminal evidence which has been
particularly intense during the last decade.
The paper-by Mr Justice Adrian Roden of the New South‘Wales
Supreme Court represents a valuable line of approach to legal develop-
ment in this area. The skills of Mr Justice Roden in legal analysis are well
known and widely respected. His paper particularly emphasises the difﬁr .
cultics ﬂowing from complex jury directions, and he refers to the neces-
sity for courts to be “constantly‘on guard against an over-indulgence in
(iobbledegook" in the law of evidence. As he points out, the reality of
what happensIn the courtroom may not be reﬂectedIn the language of
the law.
Mr T. H. Smith of the Australian Law Reform'Commission can-
vasses some of the arguments against the protective rules of criminal
evidence which are said by some — notably the English Criminal Law
Revision Committee in its l2th Report - to tilt the balance too far
against the Crown. Mr Smith says that:
. The Australian Law Reform Commission is not at this stage
persuaded that the traditional view of the criminal trial should be
modiﬁed to change the balance between the rights of the Crown and
the accused.‘
ThisIs a signiﬁcant statement which inaction would suggest is accepted
by most Australian legislatures.
This volume contains a number of other interesting and useful
commentaries characterized by an emphasis upon the reality or What
occurs inside and outside the courtroom. lnevitably, we are left with the
question “Whose reality?“', but that is the intellectual challenge faced by
all those who venture further into the mansion ofJurIsprudence than the
ante——.room ~
CRIMINAL, EVIDENCE —- THE LAW
AND THE GOBBLEDEGOOK
The Honourable Mr Justice Adrian Roden
A Justice of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales
Introduction: A. Some Assertions
l. The purpose of evidence is to provide for the appropriate tribunal
the material upon which it will arrive at its ﬁndings on questions of fact.
2. The function of the Law of Evidence is to determine and regulate
the matters that may and may not be placed before the tribunal for that
purpose .
3. [he object of that Law should be to maximise theprobability of
ﬁndings which accord with the facts.
4. In arriving at its ﬁndings of fact the tribunal is_ not performing a
function whichIs peculiar to the law. ItIS commonplaceIn everyday life
for people of all callings to make important decisions on questions of
rdcl
S. In most serious criminal matters the Tribunal of Fact is a jury of
twelve, none of them lawyers.
6.. Accordingly it is to commonsense and common experience, rather
than the special acquired wisdom of the common law, that we may ﬁrst
look in seeking basic principles upon which to found a reasonable body .
ol law relating to evidence and particularly to itsadmission and ex- .
clusion.
7. It needs however, to be borne in mind that the admission and
exclusion of evidencewill not of Itself determme theﬁndings of fact. For
in arriving at these ﬁndings the tribunal will be called upon to assess
witnesses and their evidence, and to decide what weight, if any, to give to '
each. They are likely to have to decide between competing accountsvof
the same events. For these purposes a value judgment is required; no
body of rules can provide that.
8. One further matter is to be taken into account in consideration of
the Law of Evidence insofar as it relates to criminal matters. That is that
the maximization of the probability of ﬁndings that accord with the facts
ought'not to be sought at the expense of the protection of the innocent
from .wrongful conviction.
Introduction: 8. Some Consequences
9. Some propositions suggest. themselves as arising from the above I
appreciation of whatthe Law of Evidence is, or ought to be, all about.
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They are:
- (a) As a ﬁrst principle it is desirable that the tribunal have as
much relevant information as possible.
(b) Some of that information, considered alone, may well be mis-
leading (e.g. deliberately false or innocently mistaken evi-
dence), but cannot be excluded for that reason.
(c) Reliance must be placed upon the tribunal’s “good sense” and
judgment to overcome the effects of (b).
(d) It is rules providing for the exclusion, rather than the ad-
mission, of evidence, which need to be justiﬁed.
10. Two obvious grounds of justiﬁcation are:
(a) lack of relevance (used here in the widest sense of lacking
bearing on the fact to be proved); and,
(b) potential to create unacceptable risk of erngful conviction
' (sometimes referred to by the ambiguous expression “preju-
dice to the accused”). '
11. In particular circumstances special grounds may be allowed. These
include the “disciplinary principle” sometimes applied to rules govern-
ing the admission and exclusion of confessions, and “public policy" in
general. '
12. It follows that when “unreliability” is suggested as a ground (e.g. to
justify the general rule against hearsay), it ought to be incumbent upon
those who propose the rule, to justify it, and to do so bearing in mind the
matters stated in para 9 supra. “Unreliable” presumably means one of
two things, either worthy of little weight, or likely to mislead. Taking the
word in either sense, the question may reasonably be posed, “Is that a
matter to be determined by a rule of evidence, or is it a matter properly
for the Tribunal of Fact?". Rules necessarily categorise; human experi-
ence tends not to do so. Relying on rules, direct lies are admitted and
cannot be excluded, even if proved to be false on a voir dire, whilst
potentially valuable hearsay is necessarily excluded.
Comment on Introduction
13. As will be apparent to the discerning reader this Paper is not in-
tended to be a Lawyer’s Treatise on the Law of Evidence for Lawyers. It
is rather an attempt to look from outside at the body of rules with which
‘we are familiar, and which we tend to take for granted. With that “out-
side looking in” perspective, I hope to highlight some inconsistencies and
absurdities which arise from the way in which functions are divided
between rules of law and decisions of the Tribunal of Fact. 1 am con-
cerned in particular with the technical rules which exclude potentially
l‘3‘
valuable evidence and with the hopeless and unnecessary confusion to
whichjuries must be subjected by rules which it is impossible to justifyIn
telms Oi commonsense.
l4. So it is that l have introduced‘this discussion with what might be
termed general philosophizing. l belieVe that an appreciation of the pur-
pose served by evidence, and a view as to the purpose which ought to be
served by the Law of Evidence, are necessary before embarking upon
any consideration of the rules that should go to make up that Law.
Is There a Need for Reform?
IS. I propose then to look at some aspects of the Law of Evidence in
New South Wales with regard to which it seems that a case for change.
can be made out My object is to identify some of these areas and the
competing arguments and to examine them within the context of the
general propositions l have stated above
I6. A most valuable contribution to the relevant debate has been made
by the Criminal Law Revision Committee (Eng) in its Eleventh Report
((.‘mnd, 499l), and the discussion which it stimulated. That Report,
entitled “Evidence (Genera'l)”, contains a most comprehensive review of
most, if not all, of the controversial areas. Those who approach this
subject with reformist zeal will not be unduly perturbed, I trust, if I note
that the English review was begun in 1964, that the Report was produced
in I972, and that as of l98| none of Its recommendations for change has
been adopted
l7. l have quoted elsewhere, Reg. v Petroﬂ C/C.A. unreported
24.10.80, from the English Committee‘s Report and the House of Lords
debate upon it. The quotes are worth repeating:
Speaking in the H/L debate, Lord Hailsham, then Lord Chan-
cellor, after describing the rules of Criminal Law and Procedure as _
being ‘artiﬁcial, complex and in some ﬁelds almost, if not entirely
unintelligible’, referred to the fact that some convictions are
quashed ‘because the Judge has failed to state the law.accurately to
the jury'. He went on: ‘This happens not infrequently and I believe
We should sometimes ask ourselves whether this is not partly due to
unnecessary complexity in the law which the Judge is compelled to
state’. Hansard H/L VOl. No‘._‘338,r No. 40, Col.~ 1583.
and
The present law requires judges to direct juries to achieve
certain mental feats which some judges think impossible for any
lawyers to achieve; and it is no answer to criticisms of, this kind to
say, as is sometimes said, that there is no difﬁculty in directing the
jury in the way in which the courts have said they should be di-
rected There may be no difﬁculty in saying the right words; the
question is what thejury make of them and nobody can be sure of
that. —— Cmnd. 499l para 25.
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The passage last quoted continues:
One judge who wrote to us said that in his opinion some of the
rules of evidence are ‘practically incomprehensible to anybody but
a trained lawyer’ and that he was ‘sure most juries do not under-
stand them’.
18. As I'indicated when previously quoting those passages, I believe
' that their applicability in the criminal law is not limited to matters of
evidence. The view could well be held that both legislative and judicial
decisions over a period now of a number of years have taken the criminal
law to a state of technicality and artiﬁciality which justiﬁes the question,
“Are we not worshipping words at the expense of the principles they
were employedto serve?”
19. Given that the Law of Evidence should facilitate the fact-ﬁnding
process, it must be acknowledged that there are many aspects of it which,
to lay persons at least, must seem to be calculated to frustrate that objec-
tive. I see three particular problem areas in that regard:
(a) When material, which is relevant in the sense of having a
potential bearing upon a question of fact to be determined, is
withheld from the jury although they know of its existence;
(b) when evidence is heard by the jury, but, despite its apparent
relevance (in the same sense), they are directed to'disregard it,
and
(c) when evidence is admitted, but the jury is directed to consider
it with regard to some issues but not others.
20. In those cases, it may appear to minds contaminated by common-
sense, but not puriﬁed by learning in the law, that, respectively:
(a) they have not been told the whole story;
(b) they are being asked to pretend that they do not know some-
thing which they in fact do know, or
(c) they must make that pretence for one purpose, but not for
another.
21. There is, I believe, a need to keep the law, not only within reason-
able limits of understanding for juries and other lay persons who come
into contact with it; but also within reasonable limits of acceptability to
the people it is designed to serve. To quote again from the Report of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee, “the judge should be able to direct
them (juries) in a way which they can understand — and accept as reason-
able — on how they should regard a piece of evidence.” (the emphasis is
mine).
22. The three situations referred to in paras l9 and 20 arise commonly
l
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in trials before juries. I propose now to refer to everyday situations in
which they are met, and I invite you to consider them from that “outside-
looking-in" perspective which I earlier commended.
23. Situation {a}. This can arise when a witness is stopped and told
“You can‘t te I us what he said”, or the jury is given a Record of Inter-
view with one page photostated and having a large gap between Q. & A.
24 and Q. & A. 29, or a police witness says “and he told me something”.
In any of those situations — and hardly a trial passes without at least one
of them — the jury comes to know of the existence of material which has
been excluded. Two obvious consequences, both undesirable and
dangerous, are:
(i) that they Will speculate as to its content, and
(ii) that they will regard their duty as being to comply with arti-
ﬁcial rules, a state of aﬁairs that may make it difﬁcult for them
to apply that all important “commonsense”, ofthe importance
of which they will doubtless be told.
24 Situation gb). This can arise where the witness who insists on repeat-
ing hearsay is not stoppedin time, or some other excluded material is
inadvertently referred to in the presence of the jury. TWo possibilities
exist in such case. One is that the jury is discharged, and told, pre-
sumably, that it is not proper for them to decide the case because they
have heard something which, to them, probably sounds as though it
would have helped them to arrive at their decision. The other is that they
are not discharged, but are directed to decide the case on the basis that
they do not know what the witness was told (or as the case may be) even
though the witness has just told them..
25 Situatit1on (c). There are many illustrations of this, including state-
mentsmade1n the presence of the accused. A jury can properly be told
that a Police Oﬂicer said to the accused “We have been told that you were
- among people seen running away from the scene of the crime”, if the
accused‘s reaction is considered to have some relevance. The jury of
course is directed that the statement is not evidence of the fact that the
accused was so seen, or even that the police were so told. Evidence
admissible against one. but not others, of several co-accused is in the
same category, as are evidence of past misdeeds introduced to show “the
relationship between the parties”, and “fresh complaints” in sexual cases.
Evidence and directions ofthis type carry with them the same dangers as
are referred to with regard to situation (b) supra. The assumption that the
jury abides by the direction can impede defence counsel in his address, as
I shall seek to explain whendealing1n more detail with statements by co—
‘ accused ».
26. There is no easy and satisfactory answer to the problem posed by
these situations. Nonetheless it isimportant that they be recognised, and
solutions sought. One recommendation of the English Committee was
that “where evidence is admissible, it should wherever possible be so for
16
all purposes“. That is an approach that would bring its own difﬁculties.
But at least it is an approach.
27. At present juries are directed in terms which they may not under-
stand, and in my view cannot reasonably be expected to respect. I repeat
an observation I made in Petroﬂr (supra) “If juries are to respect and
apply the law, they must ﬁrst understand it and see it as embodying
principles rather than rules, and as being concerned with people, facts
and circumstances, rather than words”.
28. .I propose to turn now to certain speciﬁc areas which seem ripe for
consideration of reform, and which have been the subject of proposals
and discussions over recent years. They are Hearsay, Confessions, Onus
on Defence, and Corroboration.
Hearsay
29 “This is a branch of the law which has little to do With common-
sense”. Lord Diplock, Jones v Metcalfe (1967) 1 WLR 1286 at 1290.
30. I had intended to follow that Cryptic Observation with a simple
statement of the Common Law Rule Against Hearsay. Any reasonable
text book would do for the purpose. Or would it? In his 3rd Edn. Pro-
fessor Cross saw ﬁt to express it as follows:
' Express or implied assertions of persons other than the wit-
ness who is testifying, and assertions in documents produced to the
Court when no witness is testifying, are inadmissible as evidence of
~ the truth of that which was asserted.
One edition later it had become:
A statement other than one made by a person while giving
oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any
fact stated.
Phipson has been satisﬁed for many editions with:
I Oral and written statements made by persons who are not
parties and who are not called as witnesses are inadmissible to
prove the truth of the matters stated.
but in the Twelfth states that “the essence of the rule” is represented by
the following statement of it:.
Former statements of any person whether or not he is a wit-
ness in the proceedings, may not be givenin evidence ifthe purpose
is to tender them as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted in
them, unless they were made by a party or in certain circumstances
by the agent of a party to those proceedings and constitute ad- .
missions of facts relevant to those proceedings. -
l7
II. The dill‘erenccs are interesting if analysed. However they do not
represent dill‘erent views of the common law, as much as different forms
of expression. What is part of the rule under one formulation. becomes
an exception under another. The rule excluding prior consistent state-
ments by witnesses is usually described as “a kindred rule” rather than
part of the Rule against Hearsay.
32. Common law exceptions to the common law rule of course there
are. And statutory exceptions abound. The rule is no longer treated with
the reverence of earlier days, and the statutory encroachments are con-
siderable, although apparently (See Myers v Director of Public Prosecu-
Iinm- ( I965) AC l009) the common law exceptions are now complete.
33. Nowhere have greater inroads been made than, in England with
regard to civil proceedings, where the Evidence Act .1968 provides, inter
(Ilia: ’ ‘
2 (I) In any civil proceedings a statement. made, Whether
orally or in a document or otherwise, by any person, whether called
as a witness in those proceedings or not, shall subject to this section
and to rules of court, be admissible as evidence of any fact stated
therein of which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible.
This is a directreversal of the presumption of inadmissibility in respect
of such statements. The operation of the provision is limited, by sub-sec.
(3), to “ﬁrst-hand“ hearsay.
34. New South Wales has made its steady advance in the ﬁeld of statu~
tory exceptions, and there may be more on the way. It is, however, not
quite live years since the New South Wales Law Reform Commission
produced its 473-page Working Paper on the subject, so there is probably
some time to wait before further progress can be expected. '_
35. The arguments for and against .the Rule against Hearsay have been
well aired. The prime argument in defence of the Rule is unreliability,
, based on lack of sanction, lack of opportunity for cross-examination,
risk of inaccuracy in reporting, and relative ease of fabrication. There is
also a fear that if the doors are open to secondhand (and perhaps even
more remote) accounts of events as evidence, cases will be undesirably
prolonged, and a proliferation of side issues introduced. Opponents of
the Rule say that what could be valuable evidence is frequently excluded,
that Costs are unnecessarily incurred in providing direct evidence of
certain facts, and most importantly that some facts simply can’t be
proved, through the intervention of the death or absence of a potential
witness, or simple failure to recollect a fact of which the only records
cannot be. brought within the terms of an existing exception to the Rule. ‘
36. Those who favour retention of the Rule in criminal matters in I
particular, see the requirement that the prosecution establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt as creating special problems if the Rule were
abandoned. In the case of hearsay material relied on by the prosecution,
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it is argued that because of its inherent unreliability it can only be rel-
evant to the probabilities, and can never serve to prove a fact beyond ,
reasonable doubt. In the case of hearsay material used by the defence, it
is argued that it is easy for a witness to manufacture and report a “state-
ment” attributed to an unidentiﬁed person who is not called, and, unre-
liable though it may be, it needs only to be given a little weight, to be the
basis of a doubt which may suffice for an acquittal.
37. There seems to me to be little merit in these “special arguments". So
far as the prosecution case is concerned, capacity to prove a fact beyond
reasonable doubt is not a requirement for the admissibility of evidence.
Cases based upon circumstantial evidence provide a good example of
, matters being admitted in evidence, no one of which of itself can do more
than indicate probability, or perhaps even only consistency, but which,
. taken together, are capable of providing proof to the required degree. So
far as the argument related to the defence is concerned, if the position is
that a reasonable jury, properly directed, would regard the possibly
fabricated hearsay as creating a doubt sufﬁcient to warrant acquittal, the
corollary would appear to be that the exclusion of that evidence could
lead to a wrongful conviction.
38. There are some examples, frequently quoted, of consequences of
the application of the Rule, which it is difﬁcult to describe more accurate-
ly than by use of the word “stupid”. That of itself would perhaps be of no
moment. But in such cases the potential result is a miscarriage of justice.
And that is of great moment.
39. Jones v Metcalfe, referred to above, is one of a series of cases
frequently mentioned in this regard. They relate to such matters as car
numbers, seen by one person and written at his direction by another, in
circumstances in which if the former forgets, as he almost certainly will
after the passage of months or years, there may be no way of getting the
evidence in, although in real terms it would be as reliable as most direct
evidence, and more reliable than mUch of it. R v McLean (1967) 52 CAR
80 is an example 'of this.
40. Matters which would favour the defence have been excluded, with
equal disregard for what lay folk would probably regard as common-
sense, when the Rule has been rigidly applied. The C.L.R.C. gives two
very good examples. In Sparks v The Queen (1964) AC 964, the Privy
Council considered an appeal from the conviction of a white man in
Bermuda on a charge of indecently assaulting a girl aged just under four.
The girl was not called, but evidence was sought to be led from her
mother that the girl, shortly after the assault, had said “it was a coloured
boy”. The evidence was rejected as hearsay, and this ruling was upheld
by the Privy Council. In R v Thomson (1912) 3 QB 19, the accused was
charged with using an instrument to procure a miscarriage. The alleged
“victim” had died from an unrelated cause before the hearing, and the
defence was not allowed to lead evidence of statements attributed to her
(a) that she intended to procure her own miscarriage, and (b) that she had
done so.
19
4|. Considering these matters, not as lawyers, but as people having a
look at the law as though from the outside, the argument th'atvcommon-
sense demands the admission of such evidence appears unanswerable. It
is submitted that leaving aside this technical and largely discredited rule
of law, no responsible person charged with deciding the questions of fact
that arose in those cases, would disregard any of those pieces of evidence.
42. It is pertinent to quote more fully the passage from Lord Diplock’s
judgment in Jones v Mercalfe. of which part appears above:
I have every sympathy for the justices because the inference of '
fact that the appellant was the driver. .is irresistible as a matter or
commonsense. But thisIS a branch of the law that has little to do -
with commonsense.‘
43. Some particular types of statement call for particular consideration
with regard to the operation of the Rule against Hearsay in criminal
matters. They are:
(a) Statements by Victim. I
(b) Statements by Co-accused.
(c) Statements by Alternative Culprit.
(d) Prior Consistent and Inconsistent Statements.
(a) Statements by Victim . I
44. Examples of these statements, liable to be excluded by the Rule, are
given in Sparks and Thomson (supra). One way of overcOming the prob-
lem created by the Rule in such cases would be to provide that in crimi-
nal cases the “victim" Should be treated as a party for the purpose of the
rules of evidence. Prior statements favourable to the defence could then
be treated as admissions. “Victim” of course is not a sufﬁciently precise
term I"or the purposes of a Rule of Law. However in this paper I am more
concerned with the wood than the trees. If such a rule were introduced, it
would probably be desirable to have a wide rather than a narrowdeﬁni-
tion of “victim", particularly in a situation in which two opposing groups
were involved in violence, leading to a member of one being charged
with an offence against a member of the other.
(b) Statements by Co-accused
45. Separate consideration can be given to favourable and unfavour-
able statements in this category. In a case in which A and B are co-
accused, A may say, out of court, perhaps to the police, “Yes, I did it, and
B was in it with me”.He may say, “Yes, I did it, and there was somebody
in it with me, but it wasn’t B”. The question is for what purpose, if any,
either of those statements should be availablein B‘s case.
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46. As I understand the law as it is applied in New South Wales, in the
case of both favourable and unfavourable statements the answer is that
they are inadmissible, and at a joint trial the jury will be directed to
disregard them when considering whether B’s guilt has been established.
47. Let us look now at the unfavourable statement, noting ﬁrst that the
English Criminal Law Revision Committee made a majority recommen-
dation that the prosecution be entitled to lead evidence of it against B,
and that the New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended
that it be so admissible, provided that A testiﬁes. Those recommenda-
tions are a sufﬁcient indication that a signiﬁcant body of informed
opinion is opposed to a continuance of the present prohibition.
48. 'A powerful argument against the proposed change is that hearsay
by A is even more unreliable than hearsay in general. lfA gave evidence
against B as a prosecution witness, having already pleaded guilty and
been dealt with, there would normally be a warning of the danger of
acting on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The proposed
admission of his out-of—court statement would combine the unreliability
of accomplices with the unreliability of unswom, untested statements.
Furthermore, so long as A and B remained co-accused, A would not be a
compellable witness, so that the prosecution could not be required (as
may be the case with other hearsay that is allowed)»to call the maker of
the statement for cross-examination. Finally, if A is so far implicated that
he entertains no hope of acquittal, he is in a position to “dob in” anyone
he chooses, and his own admitted guilt (if his statement is accepted)
makes him a person whose statement cannot be relied on.
49. The special case in which each of A and B denies guilt and makes a
statement accusing the other, is one, it is argued, in which the self-interest
of the maker makes the statement of no value.
50. Weight has to be given to all those arguments. And against them
' there has to be weighed the proposition stated early in this paper that we
necessarily rely upon the sense ofjudgment of our tribunals of fact. It is
their task to assess the weight to be given'to each piece of evidence. They,
it may be argued, are able" to appreciate each of the points raised by those
Who 'would retain the present prohibition. And indeed it_ is their assess-
ment, made in the light of the circumstances of each-particular case,
which arguably is more important and more likely to lead to a just result,
than an inflexible rule laid down by lawyers in. anticipation, but in ignor-
ance, of those circumstances.
5]. On the other side it is argued that there are occasions when the
statement by one accused, viewed sensibly in the light of all the circum-
stances, is properly to be regarded as a telling piece of evidence against
the other. The prosecution, which has that statement, cannot call its
maker because he is not compellable, and so the court is denied the use of
signiﬁcant relevant material. The statement is likely to be rather more
than simply “B was in it too”. It may attribute particular acts of partici-
pation to B, and it may be that independent admissible evidence is given
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a signiﬁcance by that statement, thatit would otherwise lack. A may say
that B tore his clothing or injured himselfIn a certain way in the commis-
sion of the offence. B or his clothing may be found to beIn a condition
that conﬁrms the statement. In such circumstances the prosecution would
. he denied the benefit, not only of A’s accusation, but also of the signiﬁ- '
canoe and weight of that other evidence.
52. Other arguments in favour of the admission of such statements are
(a) that their exclusion can lead to absurd conclusions, (b) that the pre-
sent rule necessitates potentially confusing directions, and (c) that the
tribunal of fact will hear the inadmissible material anyway in ajoint trial,
and the dangers of misuse of the evidence can be greater under the
present than under the proposed law. ~ -
53. To support the ﬁrst of these propositions let me refer brieﬂy to the
facts of an actual case. A and B were charged with rape. It was common
ground that they had taken the complainant in a car to an isolated area
where both had sexual intercourse with her. The complainant gave evi-
dence of acts of violence by both accused, and of resistance and lack of
consent on her part, in respect of both acts of intercourse, which had
followed one immediately upon the other. Both accused at their trial
dcniedthe violence, and alleged consent in respect of both acts ofinter-f
course. The only point of difference between the accused was'in their
statements to the police. A had made signiﬁcant admissions relating to
them both; B had made no such admissions. Upon any reasonble view of
the facts, it seemed clear that the truth of the matter was either that the
woman was raped by both men, or that she consented to both of them. A
was convicted and B acquitted. The explanation must be that thejury was
notsatisﬁed beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the complainant’s
evidence and whatever objective evidence there may have been. In the
case of accused A, the admissions were available as corroboration, and
they apparently were enough to ~resolve such doubts as the 'jury might
otherwise have had. In the case of B, that statement was not available,
and so, correctly following the directions they had been given the jury
acquitted. An appeal by A on the ground of inconsistent verdicts, failed.
(The appealIS reported at (l97l) l NSWLR 613).
54. The directions necessitated by the present rule are of the type refer-
red to in para 25 supra. It must be difﬁcult for juries to understand what
they are being asked to do. And if they do understand, it must be even.
more difﬁcult for them to accept it as being reasonable or sensible. De-
spite the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, it must be doubted
whether juries as a general rule comply with the direction. A stronger
statement to this effect is to be found in the English Criminal Law Re-
vision~Committee‘s Report, where the following appears in para 251 as
representing the majority view:
to make the statement admissible. .gets rid of the absurd
situation which occurs under the present law that. .it is necessary
to direct thejury that the statement is admissibleIn evidence against
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A. but not against B. This is a subtlety which must be confusing to
juries, and in reality they will inevitably take the statement into
account against both accused. .
55. If juries do generally take such statements into account in disobedi-
ence to the direction (which then is no more than a ritual neceSsary to
protect any ensuing conviction), it seems that it may be to the disadvan-
tage of the accused against whom the statement is wrongly used, not to
acknowledge the fact and treat the statement as relevant in that accused’s
case. So long as the direction is given and presumed to be followed, the
statement is treated as simply not being before the jury for the purpose of
that accused’s case, and it is “taboo” so far as his counsel’s address is
‘ concerned. I have heard counsel stopped when they have sought to ex-
plain why, even if the jury were allowed to consider it, they should give
no weight to the co-accused’s statement. If the view “in reality they will
, inevitably take the statement into account against both accused” has any
basis in fact, juriesare considering as evidence against accused persons
material which those accused are precluded from dealing with in their or
their counsel’s addresses. It may even be that in some cases, evidence
could be available to contradict such material, but cannot be led because
it is otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible. It seems to me that there is
little point in. retaining a rule which is honoured in the breach to the
disadvantage of those for whose beneﬁt it is said to be designed. .
56. The case for allowing out-of-court statements by accused A which
are favourable to accused B, to be admitted in the case of accused B, is of
course much stronger, especially if the statement is inculpatory so far as
the maker is concerned. A lot of arguments relating to unfavourable
statements by co-accused can be applied here also mutatis mutandis.
57. If A, who is likely to know more about the offence than anyone else,
says that B was not involved in it, that, it seems to me, is a most signiﬁ-
cant fact when it comes to determining whether B is guilty. B would
naturally want to let the jury know that that is what A has said. But how
can he? Normally, if a party seeks to lead hearsay evidence, is met with
the brick wall Of the present Rule Against, and says “Well what am Ito
do?", the answer is “Call the person, and let him say it in Court”. What is
the position of our friend B if he seeks to do that?
58. On the basis that both A and B havebeen charged, A, at the time of
B’s trial, may be: .
(a) a co-accused; or
(b) awaiting a separate trial; or
. (c) already convicted and sentenced; or
(d) already acquitted.
59. In case (a), A is not a compellable witness. In case (b), A is entitled
to the beneﬁt of the privilege against self-incrimination. In cases (0) and
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(d), A “now has nothing to lose and would naturally help his friend and
accomplice"; it is doubtful if evidence of his earlier (consistent) state-
ment could be led to show that‘it pre-dated his conviction or acquittal.
60. There is no way practically open to B, in which he can get A’s
statement properly before the jury, unless it is admitted in the face of the
present Rule against Hearsay. True it is that A would not be cross-
examined on it (unless he chose for his own purposes to go into the box).
True it is that A may be a scoundrel, and not readily to be believed in
anything he says. But those matters go to weight, and in my judgment
ought not to be allowed to deny B the right to have the jury know of the
statement, and accept or reject it as they will, in the exercise of their ’
proper function.
6|. With regard to the favourable out-of—court statement by a co-
accused, there is a passage in the Criminal Law Revision Committee
Report which I ﬁnd intriguing. I ﬁnd it so in the light of my understand-
ing that such statement is not evidence except in the case of its maker.
The passage is in para 53 under the heading “Confessions”. It reads:
We have no doubt that the rule (i.e. the requirement of vol- ‘
untariness) applies only to admissibility on behalf of the prosecu-
tion and that an accused person may, in order to exculpate himself,
give in evidence a confession alleged to have been made by his co-
accused, regardless of the methods by which it was obtained.
What is interesting is not what is said about the rule relating to vol-
untariness, but rather the underlying acceptance of the proposition that
. one accused‘s confession, i..e out-of—court statement, is available to his
co--accused as evidence. Eminently reasonable though that may be, it
does not, I apprehend, correspond with the view of the common law
commonly held and appliedinNew South Wales.
(c) ‘ Statements by Alternative Culprit
 
(12. The defence will sometimes develop a case that it is consistent with
the evidence, or that it is a hypothesis reasonably open on the evidence,
that somebody else and not the accused, committed the offence. Some-
times the evidence will enable the defence to nominate that somebody
else. In such event, it is submitted, thereIS a case for the admission of out-
of-court statements by that person, which, if treated as evidence of the
truth of their contents, would support that hypothesis. If a person other
than the accused were shown to have had a motive, and evidence were
tendered that after the offence that person claimed to have committed it,
it is difﬁcult to see that that fact does not have relevance. Its relevance,
however, depends upon treating the statement as capable of proving the
truth of its contents. On what basis can it be got in? As a witness for the
defence, the “alternative culprit” would almost certainly be adverse.
Cross-examination then upon his prior inconsistent statement could not.
as the law stands, put that statement before the jury as evidence of its
truth. I11 any event the “alternative culprit” may have disappeared or
died. In _Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82, the High Court appears
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to accept that such evidence is admissible. If there is a principle on the
basis on which such evidence defeats the Rule against Hearsay, it is
probably one which treats such person as though he were a party. This 1
have earlier suggested might be a reasonable approach1n the case also of
“victims.
(d) Prior Consistent and Inconsistent Statements
 
63. This is an area of choice Gobbledegook. Prior inconsistent state-
ments of witnesses may be used to cast doubt on the evidence given by
them, but not as evidence of the truth of such prior statements. That is a
simple enough rule, provided one is able to give it a meaning which has
any practical signiﬁcance.
Illustration:
Evidence in Court: “I was there; I saw it happen”.
Cross-examination: “Did you not say on a prior occasion, ‘I was not
there; I didn’t see it happen‘?”.
Force of Rule. If that prior statement is admitted, or is denied but
independently proved, then, subject to considering any explanation
given by the witness:
(a) that statement may be taken as making it less likely that the
witness was there and saw it happen (i. e. may be used to lessen
the weight to be given to his testimony), but
(b) it may not be used as rendering it more likely that he was not
there and did not see it happen. (i.e. may not be used as
evidence of the truth of the prior statement).
64. The prior consistent statement is only admissible in special circum-
stances, and then again not as evidence of the truth of its contents. When
it is introduced, e.g. in answer to a suggestion of recent invention, it can
so back-date any “invention” as to make invention at any time unlikely.
The effect must be, it seems to me, to make it more likely that the evi-
dence was truthful, and if the evidence and prior statement was to the
same effect (as the term “consistent” seems to require), then the statement
is being used as evidence of the truth of its contents.
65. There no doubt are cases in which the existence of a prior statement
has a neutralising effect on evidence rather than tending to establish
anything itself. But if that is so, it is because of the nature of the particu-
lar piece of evidence and the particular prior statement. It may also be
that a more accomplished philosophy scholar will be able to explain the
subtle distinction I have apparently missed. But of what concern is that
to the humble juror, or the humbler trial judge?
66. I refuse to seek to analyse the directions given as to what a “fresh
complaint" is and is not capable of proving. The introduction of a notion
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of consistency between complaint and testimony is a far cry from the
original “hue and cry” justiﬁcation for the rule. And with an abundance
of sound reasons available for not complaining (now formally
recognised in the proposed sec. 4058 of the Crimes Act, still in the Bill
stage as I write), where are we if not in a position of examining what
complaint was or was not made out-of-court and seeking to draw some
inferencefrom it. To believe that that inference is not as to the truth or
falsehood of the contents of the complaint is an achievement to which
only lawyers would lay claim.
. 67. Any radical alteration to the Rule against Hearsay and to its “kin-
dred rules” and their large family of exceptions, will of course bring with
it many problems, perhaps more than it solves. The “new rule” will have
its conditions and exceptions. The reformers will have to decide whether
to stop at ﬁrst-hand hearsay, whether to allow the Court some discretion,
and whether to require notices to be given, or witnesses called, in certain
circumstances. Those who have read any of the various proposals that
have been made will doubtless have the picture of a multiplicity of
sections, sub-sections and paragraphs, weaving their way in and around
the detailed provisions that have been devised to “simplify” and rational-
ise this branch of the law. Neither a paper of this size, nor a seminar of
the type. for which it is being prepared, is the appropriate place or forum
for such matters of detail.
68. May I close this part of the paper with another quote, this time from
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission’s Working Paper on the
Rule against Hearsay, 1976, at p 14:
We think that the ideal to which the law of evidence should
move in all areas, unless good cause to the contrary 'is clearly
shown, is to admit such material as an intelligent layman carefully
making important decisions in his own affairs would regard as
worth taking into account. . . . The law falls well short of this ideal.
Confessions
69. Confessions, admissions and other statements by an accused person
are only admissible in evidence against him if shown to have been made
voluntarily. In New South Wales, sec. 4l0 of the Crimes Act puts some
icing on the common law rule, but basically the principle is the same, and
voluntariness is the test.
70. Some variations on that theme have been proposed. In some cases
they are to do with modes of ensuring voluntariness and accuracy. These
. proposals commonly relate to the electronic recording of formal state-
ments. In. other cases more radical changes have been suggested, inclu-
ding the admission of all alleged confessions etc., it being left to the'
Tribunal of Fact to consider any element of pressure or force as going to
its weight. Proposals of the latter type have received little support. I
mention them only to make it clear that the requirement of voluntariness
as a condition precedent to admissibility is not to be taken for granted in
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any look at the present law taken for the purpose of considering possible
change.
71. The requirement for voluntariness is presently there, I would not
wish to remove it, and I don’t at this stage propose to review the argu-
ments that the proponents of change in-this area advance, ‘
72. An important question is “How is that voluntariness established?”.
The requirement has been around as part of the common law for a long
time. One would expect that the‘answer might by now have been clearly
established. But has it? ,
73. That the onus of proof of voluntariness is on the Crown is beyond
question. But what is the standard of proof required? In Australia it is
customary to refer to Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559, as auth—
ority for the proposition that the standard is balance of probabilities
only. That proposition is however in direct conﬂict with an unequivocal
statement of the law by Lord Hailsham in D.P.P. v Ping Lin (I976) AC
574 at 597:
The question raised was as to the admissibility of a signiﬁcant
part of it, and this in turn depends upon the application of the well
known rule, peculiar to English law and its derivative systems, that
to be admissible, confessions, however convincing, must be volun-
tary in the sense that the prosecution must prove, and prove beyond
reasonable doubt, in the classical words of Lord Sumner in Ibrahim
v The Queen (1914) AC 599 at 609, ‘that it had not been obtained
from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised
(sic) or held out by a person in authority’. '
Wendo is commonly applied in New South Wales, and has been in South
Australia in R v Staﬂord(1976) 13 SASR 392, and in Queensland in R v
Hagan (1966) QSR 219. Judges have occasionally opted for the higher
standard of proof, notably Gibbs, J (as he then was) in R v Beere (1965)
QSR 370, and Yeldham, .1 who followed that lead in Dixon v McCarthy
(1975) NSWLR 617 at 639, where he said:
In R v Beere, Gibbs I when a member of the Supreme Court of
[Queensland . . . said that if proceedings surrounding a confession
or statement raise a doubt that it has been obtained by any induce-
ment or is not free and voluntary, then it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to remove the doubt or the confession will be rejected.
' His Honour, in referring to Wendo v The Queen, said that he could
not believe that the High Court in that case intended to lay down
anything at variance with that proposition, and with this I respect-
fully agree.
It is interesting to note however that Gibbs J was a member of the Court
in Hagan about two years later, and there said at 227:
In my view we should follow the dicta of the High Court in
Wendo v The Queen and take the law to be that on a voir dire the
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prosecution must show afﬁrmatively to the satisfaction of the judge
that a confession tendered in evidence was voluntarily made, but
that the standard of proof to be applied is that of the balance of
probabilities.
74. The observations on standard of proof in Wendo are probably
properly to be regarded as obiter and Ping Lin is at least of the highest
persuasive authority. We may have to wait until the matter is directly
before the High Court before being able to say with certainty what the
common law of New South Walesis on the point. When the matter is
argued before the High Court, reference may be made to the fact that the
analogies in Wendo to other rulesof evidence all related to questions of
the mode of proof rather than the fact to be proved. This distinction may
enable the Court to decide that Ping Lin is to be preferred.
75. Voluntariness is frequently considered within the narrbw conﬁnes
of questions relating to what occurred at the time and place of interview.
In many cases it is no less important to look at the circumstances which
brought the accused into the interview situation. It is there that utter
confusion reigns. ThereIS an artiﬁciality and uncertainty that surrounds
this aspect of the lawin New South Wales.
76. First the artiﬁcialty. In the case of a person not yet under arrest,
voluntariness in accompanying the police to the police station, and in
remaining there, can be (as critical to the true voluntariness of any con-
fession then obtained, as thevoluntariness of any conduct by the suspect ‘
whilst he is there. Yet the efforts made to ensure voluntariness in that
wider sense are minimal. I referred to this when considering a confession
allegedly obtained from a suspect while he was unlawfully detained, in R
v.HinIon (District Court NSW l4th April [978). I said there:
A lot of what presently traditionally occurs during interroga-
tion in New South Wales is based more, it seems to me, on folk lore
than on criminal law. The requirement of voluntariness in the
answering of questions is invariably taken to require'a recitation
that goes by the name of ‘The Caution’, yet the requirement that a ‘
person be free to go as he pleases is deemed to be satisﬁed without
any explanation to that person being necessary.
I repeat the observation which I made when giving my ruling
in R v Askar(District Court NSW, 6th April 1978):
‘There is no provision in our law for the imposition on sus-
pects of some form of restraint for questioning prior to formal
arrest. There is no grey area between the black and white of liberty
and custody. In all probability, many persons ‘invited’ to accom-
pany the'police and assist them in their enquiries are unawareof the
liberty to which they are then entitled. The view is said to be widely
held that it is only so long as-there is such ignorance that the present
system is acceptable. I believe that this is an area crying out for
legislative reform. I believe that we ought not to tolerate a situation
within the administration of criminal justice'which enables us to
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proclaim the freedom and protection which our system notionally
provides, whilst in real terms the system only works because a
sufﬁcient number of persons are unaware ofand thus fail to avail
themselves of them.
77. And now the uncertainty. It is generally believed that police powers
of interrogation are wider before than after arrest. Hence the Record of
Interview customarily precedes arrest and formal charge, even in cases in,
which there is sufﬁcient material to justify arrest and charge, and indeed
a determination has been made before interview, to take that course. In
such cases the “invitation” or “request” to accompany the police to the
station is likely to be a ﬁrm one. The problem for the ofﬁcers who convey
the invitation, and then convey the suspect, comes in court, when they are
asked whether the accused was then under arrest? If the answer is “Yes‘f,
questions may arise as to the propriety of the subsequent interrogation,
and as to the propriety of the arrest itself, with further questions as to the
sufﬁciency of the material then available. If it is. “No", questions of
unlawful restraint may arise. Few who practise in the criminal jurisdic-
tion have not seen the discomfort to which police ofﬁcers are subjected
by the dilemma such questioning can create. The sadistic cross-examiner
is likely to aSk whether his client was free to leave if he chose to do so
while in the interview room. The experienced detective will reply that
that situation did not arise and that he did not turn his mind to it.
78. The uncertainty surrounding this stage of the investigation process
has attracted the attention of the Law Reformers. The Australia Law
Reform. COmmission produced its report on Criminal Investigation
(ALRC 2) in 1975.. The Commission favoured a “holding period" not
exceeding four (4) hours. Linked to most proposals for a clearly deﬁned
“grey area” of that nature between liberty and formal arrest custody, are
' proposals to allow “comment” on failure to answer questions, and pro- ‘
posals to regulate the recording of interviews, with one or other of elec-
tronic devices and independent witnesses generally mentioned.
79. The law of evidence relating to confessions is so linked with the law
relating to police powers with regard to interrogations, that it is worth
looking brieﬂy at those aspects of proposals relating tointerrogation. ‘
80. So far as the formal recording of interviews is concerned, there can
be no doubt that primafacie it is desirable that all interviews be recorded
in the most reliable manner possible, with even the videotape preferred
to the sound tape. It must be recognised that facilities would not always
be available at the time and place at which interview was appropriate,
* but subject to that, it is difﬁcult to resist the proposition that reliable
records. will reduce the area of dispute regarding both the truthfulness
and the accuracy of police evidence. The objection that “tapes can be
tampered with”, seems to be adequately met by the reply “but less easily
' than documents or verbals”. Safeguards, of course, there would have to
be. -
81. The objection of substance is that a suspect is less likely to confessif
the atmosphere of the interview room is made more formal. Oral con-
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l‘essions have been received in Court, and convictions have ﬂowed from
them, in cases in which the interviewing police have been told “I’ll tell
you, but only if you put that typewriter away. I want nothing taken
down‘. Ifthe relevant legislation contained prOvisions for the admission
ol conleSsions even if the prescribed form of recording were not adopted,
with as has been suggested, the onus of proof as to voluntariness on the
accused if the prescribed form of recording is used and on the prosecu-
tion if it is not, this would go some way towards meeting the objection.
However, I believe it is valid'to say in answer to that, that once legislation
provides for a standard formal method of recording intervews, or for
independent witnesses to them, any alleged confession obtained‘‘outside
the rules" is likely to be treated as highly suspect,and far less likely to be
. admitted than at present.
82. In general, law enforcement agencies do not favour such proposals.
Similarly those who are concerned with protecting the rights of potential
interrogatees are unhappy about a formalised holding period and allow-
ing comment on failure to answer questions. Looked 'at again from “out-
side", it may be that these can be seen as a fair quid pro quo for one
another.
83. The opposition to “comment” is perhaps misguided. The same can
be said about “comment” on an accused’s decision to make an unsworn
statement in court. In eithercase (asgindeed in the case of the Co-ac-
cused‘s Record of Interview), with comment prohibited, the jury is left to
speculate unaided. If there are good reasons for a suspect declining to
answer questions, then it seems to me to be reasonable to allow his
silence and those reasons to go before the jury. This is at least arguably
preferable to telling them that they may not draw inferences, and-then
taking the risk that they will do so nonetheless.
84 The opposition to a holding period for the purpose of questioning is
understandable among those who have been brought up in a system
which so highly cherishes the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to silence. Few who are part of our system of criminal justice can
fail to feel some instinctive drive to be part of that opposition. But upon
reﬂection it may be found that those whose interests the opponents of the
proposal are most anxious to serve are those who in fact suﬂ‘er,under the
present system. It is the simple folk'and the under-privileged, those less
aware of the subtleties and technicalities of the law, and those less famil-
iar with Anglo—Saxon culture and the common law which is part of it,
who are most likely to accept the “invitation” to assist the police, because
they believe they are obliged to, and who are less likely to take advantage
of “the Caution“, because they either do not understand, or cannot be-
lieve what it appears to say.
85. It may be that a formal holding period, regulated recording proce-
dures, and a right to comment on silence, are net such a bad package
after all.
86. Uncertainty as to the position in New South Wales may be attribut-
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able in part to the absence of judicially approved guidelines to ﬁll the
legislative vacuum.
87. In England the Judges’ Rules, original and new, have ﬁlled this
role. As an indication of how those who exercise the discretion to admit
and reject will exercise that discretion, their. value is considerable, both to
police and to practitioners.
88. Once frequently referred to in New South Wales, they are now
treated as “foreign” and inapplicable. Their fall from grace came sud-
denly in 1964 with the decision of McClemens J in R v Ragen (1964) 81
WN (Pt. 1) 572. The N.S.W. Police Commissioner’s Instructions, His
Honour felt, had the force of law. He referred to the Police Regulation
Act, Rules made thereunder by the Governor by virtue of which the
Police Force was under the control of the Premier, and the position of the
Commissoner who was directly responsible to the Premier, with power to
issue “such instructions for the government or direction of the force as he
considers the circumstance require”. The rules, he said, have authority in
New South Wales “because the Commissioner has exercised a power
given to him by law”.
89. In the same judgment McClemens J said at 577, “If the instructions
. . . are complied with then there can be no valid criticism of the police
concerned”, and at 578 “I think that the new Judges’ Rules should not be
applied by the courts here”.
90. It seems, with respect, that it may be inappropriate to equate in-
structions given to police ofﬁcers, with the means necessary to ensure
voluntariness and fairness so as to attain admissibility and the exercise of
discretion in favour of admission. The latter must be a matter for the
courts. Neither the Police Regulation Act, nor Rules made thereunder, can
properly be read, I believe, as passing that power to the Commissioner.
91. We are then, as I see it, at a disadvantage compared with England,
where the revised Judges’ Rules operate. The need for such Rules there
may be greater, with the proliferation of police forces, but the power of
the Commissioner to regulate the one Police Force of this State, ought
not to stand in the way of legislative or judicial regulation of the interro-
gation process, as has been achieved to some extent in the case of young
persons, by sec. 81C of the Child Welfare Act.
92. I return to and complete the quotation from my remarks in R v
Askar: ‘
. This is neither the time nor the place to comment on what the
law should be. I believe, however, that the opportunity ought notto
be allowed to pass without observing that steps ought to be taken
one way or the other to ensure that the law, whatever it be, be both
widely known and widely observed.
()nus Home by Defence
93. In many matters of “defence”, the defence bears an evidential bur-
den only, and once the matter is fairly raised, the ultimate persuasive
onus of proof is upon the prosecution. One example is self-defence. In
other matters the defence bears the full persuasive onus, the standard
then being balance of probabilities One exampleis mental illness; all
other examples are stattitory.
94. The Criminal Law Revision'Committee “strongly” recommended
that burdens on the defence should be evidential only. That recommen-
dation‘has much to commend it.
95. The imposition ofthe persuasive onus on the defence is contrary to
general principle, and can create confusion and inconsistency.
96. The proposition that it is contrary to general principle requires only
:1 reference to Woolmington and The Golden Thread. I expressed a view
on this in R v Kennedy(l979) 25 ALR 367. That case was concerned with
the interpretation of a particular statute, and I hasten to state that mine
was a minority view on that matter. The observations however are perti-
nent to the question of principle now under consideration. Dealing with
the offence of possessing illegally imported heroin, and with the proposi-
tion that the persuasive onus of proof on an issue of mistake was upon
the defence, 1 said, at 388: ~ -
That direction as to onus and standard of proof, as I under-
stand the principle upon which it is based, would be appropriate in
every case in which a person is charged with this offence on the
basis of having picked up or held or carried a container which, in
fact, has imported heroin1n it. If he says that he picked it up by
mistake, the jury would be directed to convict, even if they enter-
tained a real doubt on that mistake issue; even indeed if the ‘scales
of probability‘ were found by them to be evenly balanced and they
were unable to decide the issue one way or the other.
97. The imposition of the persuasive onus on the defence is calculated
to create confusion at two levels. First there can be confusion among
lawyers as to which onus it is that the defence bears on a particular issue.
As good an illustration of this as any is to be found in the various
judgments in Johnson v The Queen (1977) 136 CLR 619. The second level
of confusion is for juries. lf there were only an evidential burden, the
matter would not have to be mentioned to them at all. There would be
one persuasive onus, the one party would bear it, and there would be but
one standard. With the defence bearing the persuasive onus, there are
two such onera to be explained, and two standards. Such confusion is
added to by an element ofinconsistencyin each of thefollowing illustra:
IIOHS.
98. The ﬁrst relates to provocation. Provocation operates at common
law to ”reduce" murder to manslaughter. At common law the defence
bears an evidential onus only, in respect of its elements. In Johnson,
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supra, the majority of the High Court decided that in New South Wales
the defence bears a persuasive onus. The reason is to be found in the
wording of sec. 23 of the Crimes Act, based apparently upon what must
now be regarded as a misconception as. to the common law, yet to be
corrected some 46 years after the decision in Woolmington. In any event
that is now the law in New South Wales. Self-defence in New South
Wales, on the other hand, does not depart from the common law‘rule,
and so in relation to it the defence bears an evidential onus only. What
then is the position when the same alleged fact, e.g. a blow struck by the
deceased, is available as a circumstance capable of “reducing” murder to
manslaughter, either on the basis of provocation or on the basis of “ex-
cessive self-defence”. For the purpose of each “defence”, the jury will
have to consider whether the alleged blow was struck. For one purpose
they will “ﬁnd" that it was struck, unless they are satisﬁed beyond reason-
able doubt that it was not. For the other they will need to be satisﬁed that,
more probably than not, it was struck, before being able properly so to
ﬁnd. In effect they may arrive at two conﬂicting ﬁndings of fact for the
two purposes. If they do, and are concerned about it, and ask, the trial
judge will presumably have to say, “That’s all right; don’t worry about it;
that’s the way the law works”.
99. The other illustration of the potential for confusion combined with
inconsistency relates to cases in which there is an issue of mental illness
or diminished responsibility raised, and a speciﬁc intent is an element of
the offence to be proved by the prosecution. The issue raised by the
defence, and the element of the offence to be proved by the prosecution,
obviously cover some common ground. Assume that the condition of
mind alleged on behalf of the defence is such that, if present, it would
prevent the accused from forming the requisite intent. Again there would
be a question of fact to be resolved according to one onus and standard
for one purpose, and according to a different onus and standard for
another. Indeed logically the “special defence” could only succeed in
' circumstances in which the prosecution must fail. Reg. v S. (1979) 2
NSWLR 1 overcomes this, by providing that in such cases the, evidence
relating to the accused’s alleged mental state is to be disregarded in
deciding his intention. That necessarily involves a ﬁction, and again can
result in a jury being required to decide two issues on the basis of con-
ﬂicting ﬁndings of fact. The assumption of sanity may have difﬁculty in
surviving in the post Woolmington era, especially in the light of the
majority decision in O'Connor v The Queen (1980) 29 ALR 449. Indeed if
drunkenness is before the jury at the same time as mental illness, an array
of combinations and permutations will be available that would almost
require a computer on the bench and twelve more in the jury room.
Applying both S and O'Connor. the appropriate gobbledegook would
suggest, it seems, that the law more readily and fully excuses unwilled
acts brought on by self-induced intoxication, than the same acts equally
unwilled, but committed by those who through no fault of their own, are
afﬂicted with illness.
100. The only argument of which I am aware against respecting the A
Woolmington principle and casting only an evidential onus on the de-
fence in all such cases, is that an accused can readily fabricate a defence
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in an area within his special knowledge, which the prosecution can do
little to disprove. There appear to be two answers to this. One is similar to
that advanced in respect of the corresponding argument regarding hear-
say. That is that if the material touching the matter of defence is sufﬁcient
to raise the issue, and is capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt in
the minds ofa reasonable and properly directed jury, then the imposition
of the persuasive onus upon the defence could lead to a wrongful convic-
tion. The other is that the law does it anyway, e.g. with self-defence,
automatism and “claims of right”, and the common law did it in respect
of all matters of defence except insanity. Mental illness may have to
remain a special case, at least soglong as the verdict has its present
consequences. ' ‘
Corroboration
l()|. I included corroboration in the list of “ripe areas”, not so much
because of any proposal for change about which I seek to stimulate
discussion, but rather because of the excellent example of gobbledegook
which it provides. In a case in which an accomplice has given evidence
whichIs damning to his former friend, directions to the following effect
might be expected to be given: .
(a) It is dangerous toconvict on the uncorroborated'testimony of
an accomplice.
(b) Even though it is dangerous to do so, you may, provided that
you scrutinise his evidence carefully, and bearing in mind the
caution just given, you aresatisﬁed beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused.
(c) In this case you may regard Joe Blow as an accomplice. He is,
if he is a person who participated in the commission of the
offence.
(d) Corroboration is evidence, independent of the person whose
evidence is to be corroborated, which tends to show both that
the offence was committed and that the accused committed it.
(e) Whether there is any material in this case which corroborates
the evidence of Joe Blow is a matter for you.
(I) 1 direct you as a matter of law that there is material capable of
being corroboration.
(g) That is, for example, the evidence of. . . etc.
l()2. Directions along those lines may be expected to be given, even in
cases in which there is an abundance of evidence, independent of that of
the accomplice and capable on its own of sustaining a conviction. 1 have
set forth only the bare bones of the directions; a trial judge would nor-
mally expand, explain and illustrate the various propositions.
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103. The approach reﬂected in those directions requires that the jury
understand what is meant by “accomplice” and “corroboration”, and
further requires that they make what are really decisions of mixed fact
and law as to whether a witness is an accomplice, and as to whether his
evidence15 corroborated
104. Bearing in mind that they may convict evenin the absence of
corroboration, why are those tasks, likely to be strange and difﬁcult to
many a jury, superimposed upon their real responsibility, which is to
make their assessment of the evidence as a whole, and to determine
whether it proves the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
105. If it is considered necessary or desirable, a jury may be told of
reasons justifying the exercise of extreme caution before accepting and
acting upon the evidence of a particular witness. They may be told that1n
the case of such a witness it is generally regarded as important to see
whether there is some material independent of him tending to support
the truth of what he says. But that can be done, it seems to me, without
introducing the legal concepts of accomplice and corroboration, without
requiring the jury to make the decisions of mixed fact and law referred
to, and without the potentially self-cancelling directions:
(a) it is dangerous, but
(b) you may do it;
(c) this only applies if the witness is uncorroborated;
(d) you may ﬁnd that that is not the case here.
106. The standard corroboration warning, and the other directions
which arise from it, illustrate what may be seen as the Law’s failure to
come to grips with the task of devising rules suitable for use by juries, and
of communicating them in an appropriate way. One of the keys to effec-
tive communication is to use the language of the person to receive the
message, rather than that of the person delivering it. I use “language“
there in the broadest sense.
Conclusion
107. I have great respect for the capacity of juries to bring to bear on
their task a valuable combined experience and commonsense, and to
counter with those qualities the Law‘s excursions into excesses of legal-
ism. If they are to continue to perform their task to the advantage of the
community we are all seeking to serve, and if they and others who come
into contact with the law are to have for the law and its institutions the
respect upon which their acceptance depends, we must keep those ex-
cesses to a minimum. So far as the Law of Evidence. is concerned, that
should have us constantly on guard against an over-indulgence in
Gobbledegook. And the time now seems ripe for a valuable review of
that Law with that end in view.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
The Honourable Mr Justice Adrian Roden
In presenting the paper I wOuld like to repeat some of the things
that l have set forth in the introductory paragraph to it. I have said that
this is not intended to be a treatise on the law of evidence prepared by a
lawyer for lawyers. I do not want it to be looked at by lawyers as lawyers.
What I am inviting is a look, as though from outside, at the body of rules
with which we are all familiar and which we tend to take for granted. 1
want to suggest that we use our “macroscopes” rather than the micro-
scopes with which lawyers are more familiar.
In order‘to make that sort .of approach to the problem, I have
suggested that it is necessary to have an appreciation of the purpose of
evidence and to have a philosophy as to what the purpose of the law of
evidence should be. I have made a suggestion in the paper which will be
found at paragraph 3 that the object ofthe law should be to maximise the
probability of ﬁndings which accord with the facts, and I have placed
one rider on that in the latter part of paragraph 8 where I say that the
maximisation of the probability of ﬁndings that accord with the facts
ought not to be sought at the expense of the protection of the innocent
from wrongful conviction. You may have other starting points which you
would suggest as more suitable than those, but I believe that if we are to
look at the Law of Evidence in criminal matters from the perspective
which I am suggesting we need some guidelines, some starting point such
as that which I have proposed.
One of the things that I am inviting, and I invite this at paragraph
l3 of the paper,‘is a consideration of the division of functions between
rules of law and ﬁndings by the tribunal of fact. I think that sometimes
when people talk about what the law of evidence should and should not
provide, they overldok the fact that the rules contained in that body of
law will not determine the. ﬁndings of fact. Those rules will determine
what matters are and'what matters are not allowed to get before the
tribunal of fact. There then follows a value judgement or an assessment
by that tribunal and it is that that leads to the ﬁnding.
When there is a proposal that we should be careful about letting
juries consider a particular matter, that comes, I imagine, because there is
a belief that there is something unreliable in that particular type of ma-
terial. The question I believe is not: “Should there be a rule, as part ofthe
law of evidence, which for that reason excludes it?”; the question should
be: “Is that unreliability a matter which it is appropriate to deal with at
the level of the law of evidence, or is it a matter that it is appropriate to
deal with at the level of the deliberations of the tribunal of fact?”
Let us think of what we are pursuing — and whether we call it a
linding of fact or truth or anything else does not really matter — as some
precious metal that we are engaged in seeking in a mining operation. In
the. mining context we might provide a piece of machinery or equipment
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like a ﬁlter. All the material that has been dug up is put into this machine
and it ﬁlters it. That which is clearly rubbish and could not provide what
is required is cast aside, and all that is allowed to pass through it is
material whichIs capable of containing the precious metal we are look-
ing for. What comes through the ﬁlter18 then examined by experts who
look at it carefully and then make their decision. They pick out the
valuable pieces and use them.
In legal proceedings the respective parties have, as the prospective
evidence, what you might in a mining operation dig out of the ground —
a lot of it is rubbish, some of it may contain what you are looking for. The
function of the law of evidence then is similar to the function of that
ﬁlter, and when any piece of potential evidence is offered it is put through
that ﬁlter, which then determines whether it is cast aside so that the
experts (the tribunal of fact) do not even see it, or it is allowed through
for the experts to consider and decide whether the precious substance
they are seeking is there. The problem with the law of evidence is that
generally it lacks discretion. It is a blunt instrument. Any assessment it
makes of a type of potential evidence as unreliable is based presumably
on probabilities. Such an assessment does not preclude the possibility
that on occasions evidence ﬁtting into that category will be of value, and
indeed necessary to the determination of truth. The question really is,
“When should we use that blunt instrument to exclude material, and
when should we rely upon the discretion, commonsense and judgement
of the tribunal of fact?”
The tribunal of fact in serious criminal matters is invariably a jury
of twelve. That is a modiﬁed random chOice of twelve ordinary people to
whom there is attributed no special skill or learning in the law, but a great
deal of commonsense and combined experience and general knowledge
which we believe ﬁt that jury to assess witnesses and to weigh evidence. It
is worth pondering for just a moment on what we do with those juries.
There they are, people with no skill or training in the law, yet we impose '
upon them difﬁcult, complicated, may I say Viroesque directions of law,
and we assume or act as though we assume that they understand and
apply them. That is how we treat juries who are unskilled and untrained
in the law. Those same juries are believed to be specially equipped to
assess witnesses and weigh evidence. Yet, through the Law of Evidence,
we act as though we are frightened to let them receive material by which
they may be misled. We, whose expertise is in the law, claim to be able to
see that the evidence would not really be of assistance and may mislead.
They, the experts in assessing evidence, would, we fear, not recognise
that fact. It is worth thinking about the way we treat our juries, attribu-
ting to them legal skills that we know they do not possess, yet treating
them as though they do not have the very ability (to assess witnesses and
weigh evidence) for which they are chosen to carry out their tasks.
Those are the general thoughts that led me to raise the various
questions that are raised in the paper.
I would like to say just one or two more things, partly because there
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has been a High Court decision that their Honours were not kind enough
to hand down until after I had written my paper, and which is relevant to
something which I have written.
ThisIS the decision in Alexander v The Queen which was handed
down on the 8th April l98l. I think that Mr RaeburnIs likely to have a
lot more to say about it than I, because it is in fact an appeal from the
matter of Alexander v KeeleyIn Victoria thatIS referred to at some length
in Mr Weinberg‘5 paper. I do not propose to refer to it because of its
bearing on the question of the use of police photographs for identiﬁca-
tion purposes. That is the matter to which I anticipate Mr Raeburn will
refer. However, in the course of the judgments in Alexander's case refer-
ence is made to a matter to which I have referred in my paper under the
heading “hearsay” (page 16). I make reference there to the McLean type
ofcase and also to Sparks’case in the Privy Council. The McLean type of
case is that where a person looking out a window sees a motor car
involved in a particular matter,'observes the number and calls out “It’s
ABC l23“, another person who does not see the car writes down “ABC
l23" in consequence of hearing the observer call out “ABC I23", and
months or years later a matter comes before a court in which the identiﬁ-
cation ofthat vehicle is relevant. The observer may only be able to say: “I
saw the number. I saw it clearly. I called it out accurately. I can’t remem-
her what it was". The other person would only be able to say"‘I wrote
down the number that the ﬁrst person called out”. You get into all sorts
of hearsay problems as to whether the evidence can be led at all. One of
the effects of the decision in Alexander appears to be that that evidence
can be led. You can have as it were a chain of evidence — two pieces of
evidence going together, as logically they appear to do, to make up one
piece of direct evidence.
However the coun also considered, or at least some of the judges
considered, the type of matter to which I have referred as the Sparks type
situation. That is, the casein which the four year old victim of an assault
was alleged to have said, “It was a coloured boy who did it”. He was not
called to give evidence, and on the trial ofa white man for the offence the
child‘s mother was not allowed to give evidence of that statement having
been made. In Alexander consideration was given to the position where
an identifying witness is unable to recall having made an identiﬁcation at
all, but there was another person present who saw the identiﬁcation
made. The question then is whether evidence can be given by that other
person of observing the identiﬁcation, when the identifying witness is
unable to give the evidence himself.
Their Honours did not agree, with the Chief Justice and Mr Justice ,
Murphy both being of the view that the evidence was not admissible, and
Mr Justice Mason of a contrary view. So, in any event, you may take as
an Appendix to the paper, the statement that Alexanders case, recently
decidedIn the High Court is relevant toboth the McLean and the Sparks
situation
They are the only matters that I wanted to mention in introducing
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the paper to you. There are some matters on which I would be particular-
ly interested to hear comment later on. They include what I have had to
say about confessions, and what the standard of- proof is that is required
_ of the Crown when it comes to establishing voluntariness; that is the
apparent conﬂict between the House of Lords and what I believe to be
observations made obiter in the High Court. Additionally I would ap-
preciate assistance with the passage that I have quoted in paragraph 6!
from the report of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, be-
cause of the difﬁculty that I have expressed in that paragraph in seeing
how that could be anappropriate comment within the context of the ,
Common Law as I understand it to be applied in New South Wales.
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ANAPPROACH TO CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE LAW REFORM
T.~H. Smith, B.A.. LL. 3..
Barrister-at-Law;
Commissioner, Australian Law
Reform Commission
Introduction
I. The Australian Law Reform Commission has before it a reference
on the reform of the laws of evidence. The reference involves a review of
the laws of evidence that apply in proceedings in Federal Courts and the.
Courts of the Territories. This review is to be conducted
with a view to producing a comprehensive law'Of evidence which is
based on concepts appropriate to current conditions and antici-
pated requirements. ~
In the light of this review the Commission is also asked to report '
(a) whether there should be uniformity‘and, if so, to what extent
in the laws of evidence used in those Courts; and
(b) the appropriate legislative means of reforming the laws of
evidence and of allowing for future changes in individual
jurisdictions should this be necessary.
2. . Some of the relevant courts — the Federal Court of Australia, the
Family Court of Australia, and the,Supreme’Courts and Courts of Petty ,
Sessions of the Australian Capital Territory and the external Territories
have criminal or quasi criminal jurisdictions. In addition, in the
Territories, there occurs trial by jury in criminal matters.
3. The terms of reference appear to assume the continued existence of
laws of evidence operating. within the framework of the adversary
system.
4. In this paper, it is proposed to describe:-
0 the Commission‘s approach to the reference as it relates to evidence
in criminal proceedings;
0 the issues that have to be considered as a result of this approach,
and in particular:
0. the nature and purpose of the criminal trial;
00 modiﬁcation of the nature and purpose of the criminal trial.
0 the ALRC‘s present position on these issues and its consequences
for the handling of the reference.
The ALRC Approach
5. The Commission has taken the view that the laws of evidence
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should reﬂect and, serve the nature and purpose of the civil and criminal
trial. In an Issues Paper' published last year, the Commission has pointed
to the many differences that exist at present in the laws of evidence as
applied in civil trials as compared to criminal trials. In the paper it is
argued that most of these differences result from the different underlying
philosophy and objectives of the civil and criminal trial — for example,
reference can be made to the right to silence, the right of the accused to
make a no case submission without having to elect to call evidence, the
strict standard of proof imposed upon the Crown, the concern to exclude
evidence of bad character of the accused and the judicial discretion to
exclude prejudicial evidence.
6. The Commission has also taken the view that in carrying out its
review of the laws of evidence and in preparing any draft proposal, it
must reach conclusions about what is and should be the nature and
purpose of the criminal trial. If there is doubt about the importance of
forming conclusions about these matters, it should be enough to refer to
the approach of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in England in its
llth Report on Evidence. It expressed its view as to the object of the
criminal trial in the following words:
Since the object of a criminal trial should be to ﬁnd out if the
accused is guilty, it follows that ideally all evidence should be ad-
missible which is relevant in the sense that it tends to render prob-
able the existence or non-existence of any fact on which the ques-
tion of innocence depends.2
The Committee thus introduced the idea of an inquiry with the ex-
pression “to ﬁnd out if the accused is guilty” and urged a change from the
traditional view that the object of the criminal trial is to determine
whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused. The Committee
also stated that:
It is as much in the public interest that a guilty person should be
convicted as it is that an innocent person should be acquitted.’
This was a signiﬁcant departure from the traditional view that it is prefer-
able, in the public interest, to acquit some guilty persons rather than to
convict one innocent person. Consistently with its views the Committee
recommended that the accused should be required to give evidence at his
trial if the Crown established a prima facie case and that, if he failed to
do so, inferences could be drawn against him.“ The Committee recom-
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mended also that it should no longer be required of the police that they
caution a suspect before interviewing him.5
7. The debate resulting from the llth Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee 0972)“ and the discussion contained in the recently
issued Report of the RoyalCommission on Criminal Procedure7 demon-
strate the importance of making decisions on these fundamental ques-
tions.
The Nature and Purpose of the Criminal Trial
8. In the Commission’s Issues Paper it is argued that our criminal trial
is not a “search for truth” — although it might be thought to be more
appropriate in a criminal trial than a civil trial to give it this character. It
should be borne in mind, however, that the tribunal of fact in a criminal
trial attempts to reach conclusions about what in fact happened. It is this
'~ process that gives the trial system its legitimacy and there needs to be
good reason for restricting the fact ﬁnding process. Justiﬁcation for such
restriction has been found in the fear of error, a concern for individual
rights and fear of abuse of governmental power”. The limitations can be
found in the traditional view of the nature and purpose of the criminal
trial.
9. The central question in a criminal trial is whether the Crown has
proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and it must
attempt to do so according to law. The purpose of the criminal trial does
not include determining the question of the innocence of the accused
person. The accused is regarded as innocent until the guilty verdict is
given andIS under no obligation to speak. Unlike a civil trial a criminal
trial is not directed to resolving a dispute between parties. Finally, the
criminal trial traditionally has been seen to reﬂect the view that it is in the
interest of community that the risk of conviction of the innocent be
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Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee‘,-35 Modern Law
Review 62l (1972) and 36 Modern Law Review 56 and 167 (1973).
7. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report Cmnd
8092, January l98l, para. 1. 5,1.24ﬂ".
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minimized even if this may result in the acquittal from time to time of the
guilty.9 The system is in fact praised by some on the basis that we prefer
to risk the acquittal of the guilty rather than risk the conviction of the
- innocent - “it is better that nine guilty men should escape than that one
innocent man should be wrongly convicted".‘° The fallibility of the exist-
ing system must be borne in mind depending as it does upon human
perception, memory, and recapitulation at all stages of the proceedings.
10. This view of the nature and purpose of the criminal trial is well
entrenched and represents what has been described as a civil libertarian
view of the criminal trial. It is also said to be justiﬁed by the seriousness
of the matters involved, and by the imbalance of resources that generally
exists in the prosecution and the adversary trial of criminal offences. It
has also been argued that it represents the learning of the lessons of
history which unfortunately are repeated around us today in totalitarian
countries.“
Modiﬁcation of the Traditional View
1 l. Demands have been made from time to time for removal of some of
the protections given to an accused person by the rules of evidence.
There is pressure, however, to return to an emphasis on law and
order (in the sense of giving priority to crime prevention) and to
' deride such strict insistence of legality and procedure as the liberal-
ism of a by--gone age.12
12. Some of the arguments were canvassed in the llth Report of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972). The English Committee ar-
gued that circumstances had changed to the extent that some of the
protections aﬂ'orded the accused person by the laws of evidence could
now be safely removed. It referred to the following considerations.
0 in'decently hasty trials are a thing of the past;
0 legal representation is more commonly available today;
0 there is the greater right of appeal against conviction;
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1980, 9.
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o a general improvement has occurred in the quality ofjuries and lay
magistrates; and . '
0 an accused person and his or her spouse now have the opportunity
to give evidence.
The Committee also argued that:
Criminals are more sophisticated than they used to be . . . There is
now a large and increasing class of sophisticated professional
criminals who are not only highly skilful in organizing their crimes
and in the steps they take to avoid detection but are well aware of
their legal rights and use every possible means to avoid conviction
if caught. These include refusal to answer questions by the police
and the elaborate manufacture of false evidence.”
Support for a different approach to the criminal trial is also to be found
in statements by senior police ofﬁcers such as Sir Robert Mark who
expressed concern about what he saw as a large and increasing class of
sophisticated professional criminals who were successful in avoiding
conviction" and by Chief Commissioner Miller who has expressed con-
cern at what he sees as the high rate of acquittals in contested jury trials.ls
lt proposed in this paper to consider these arguments in turn.
I3. Improvements in the Trial Machinery and Appeal Machinery. While
. it may be true that indecently hasty trials are a thing of the past, one may
question the assumption that legal representation is more commonly
available. As to greater rights of appeal against conviction, the right of
appeal is circumscribed and it is unusual for an appeal to be successful.
While there has been a general improvement in the educational level in
the community, juries and magistrates and judges are all still susceptible
to the inﬂuence of evidence of bad character and other evidence preju-
dicial to the accused which may have slight probative value. Finally it is
diﬂiculty to perceive the relevance to the issue of the proposition that the
accused and his or her spouse can now give evidence. In the course ofthe
vigorous debate that ensued following the issuing of the 11th Report,
Colin Tapper attacked the Report on the ground that the Committee’s
analysis about change was completely one sided. He said that:
No mention is made of, for example, the institution of the police
force and the rapid development of an immense imbalance between
its size, organisation, efﬁciency and resources all available to the
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prosecution and those at the disposal of the defence; nor of the
dramatic decrease in the proportion of crimes tried by juries; nor of
A the inroads made into the requirement of mens rea, especially, but
not exclusively, in the vastly expanded area of statutory crime.‘6
14. Sophistication of Criminals. An attempt was made to test the asser-
tion that there was a growing class of professional criminals who were
avoiding conviction and doing so at. an unacceptable rate. This research
was carried by Professor Michael Zander17 and J. A. Mack.” Un-
fortunately they both faced a problem of deﬁnition which made empiri-
cal research very dilﬁcult. In determining whether professional criminals
were avoiding conviction and doing so at an unacceptable rate, it was
necessary to deﬁne the professional criminal. Zander deﬁned the pro-
fessional criminal on the basis of the past record of the individual crimi-
nal. Mack determined who were and who were not professional crimi-
nals for the purpose of his sample in the light of information supplied to
him by the police as to whom the police regarded as coming within the
class of “professional criminals”. Both deﬁnitions, therefore, tended to
beg the question. A further difﬁculty with this research is to relate it to the
point at issue — whether the laws of evidence in some way allow too
many professional criminals to escape conviction. The amount of time
spent by a “professional criminal” out of gaol for example is not simply a
reﬂection of his success in a trial. It may also be a measure of his success
in escaping detection.
15. Two empirical studies commissioned by the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure provide further information on the extent to which
the experienced criminal refuses to answer questions when cautioned.
Research Study No. 4 by Paul Softley, “An Observational Study in Four
Police Stations”, analysed interviews with 187 suspects for the purpose of
determining the extent to which the suspects refused to answer questions
and to determine whether there is any relationship between age and
experience and a refusal to answer questions.
The conclusion made by the author of the paper was that the large
majority of suspects in-all age groups do not exercise their right to
silence. In the sample only 7 suspects (4%) exercised their right to refuse
. to answer all questions. They argue, however, that older and more experi-
enced suspects are more likely than others to do so. This argument is
based on the ﬁgures obtained for suspects who exercise their rights “to
some degree". Of the suspects in this category, some 18% over the age of
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2t) exercised their rights “to some degree“ while only 5% of those under
the age of l7 and 7% ofthose between the ages of 17 and 20 exercised the
right to some degree. As to experience, they found that 17% of those
known to have a previous record exercised their right “to some degree”
while 6% ofthose known not to have a criminal record exercised the right
“to some degree”."’ Thus age and experience appeared to combine and
overlap. It could not be said, however, that the numbers who exercised in
the right of silence “to some degree" is large. In fact, very few exercised
the right to some extent or at all. '
I6. The other paper which looked into the matter was the paper Re-
xearch Study No.5 by Baldwin and McConville, ‘Confessions in Crown
Court Trials‘. The authors stated they wished to investigate the extent to
which younger defendants and those without prior criminal experience
were more likely to confess than their 2older or more experienced counter-
parts. Reference is made in the paper2°to researchin America by Leiken
who found that those older than 25 make far fewer confessions than
those under 25. Leiken advanced as an alternative explanation the fact
that older people were “better equipped psychologically to cope with the
' interrogation situation, or experience or temperament may have been a
signiﬁcant factor”. These differences, however, were not apparently con-
firmed by a later study conducted in the United States by Neubauer.
l7. Baldwin and McConville studied cases in Birmingham and in Lon-
don and found a strong association between the age of the defendant and
the tendency to make a written or verbal confession — a confession being
deﬁned as a full admission to the offences charged. The information was
recorded in table form and is attached to this paper as Appendix A. 'The
results indicated that the younger the defendant the more likely he was to
confess. The authors state that the trend was statistically highly signiﬁ-
cant.‘
I8. On the issue of the relationship between the rate of confession and
the prior criminal record of the'defendant, the authors referred to the
study of Neubauer which produced results consistent with a hypothesis
that those who have prior experience with the system are likely to resist.
police pressure. Leiken on the other hand found there was no association
between the rate of confession and prior criminal records. Baldwin and -
McConville state that their results are somewhat equivocal with
recidivists if anything more likely to make written and oral statements (a
trend which was statistically signiﬁcant for London cases). Results were
set out in tabular form and are attached as Appendix B. In discussing the
table they point out a result which they describe as “rather surprising”
that for London cases those with prior experience of the criminal system
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were more likely to make confessions whether written or oral than those
without experience. This applied for Birmingham cases only when writ-
ten and oral statements were considered together.22
19. Baldwin and McConville also examined the Birmingham cases fur-
ther in the context of the relationship between the rate of confession and
the extent to which the defendant was regarded by the police as a pro-
fessional criminal. The conclusion that they reached as expressed in the
following terms:
Those within the present sample who were regarded by the police as
‘professional criminals' confessed at about the same rate as their
non-professional counterparts. This ﬁnding applied to both written
and verbal confessions. Thus, for example, those regarded as the
least professional made written confessions in 43% of cases and
written or verbal confessions in 56% of cases, whilst the comparable
ﬁgures for those regarded as the most professional were 36% and
56%.23
In determining their degree of professionalism, the police were asked to
provide details of the criminal record of each defendant, details of sus-
pected involvement in criminal activity or organised crime, the extent to
which the criminal made a living off crime, was skilful in criminal activi-
ties, and would use every means legal and illegal to avoid apprehension
or conviction. The conclusion of the Royal Commission is expressed in
the following terms;
The research indicates that the privilege not to incriminate oneself
is not used by suspects in the great majority of cases and keeping
silent altogether is very rare. Even in cases where the accused pleads
not guilty he will in most cases have made some statement or other
(of admission or denial) in the face of police questioningThe rarity
of complete silence may not be altogether surprising in view of the
psychological pressures that custody in the police station generates.
In present circumstances the right of silence is not a right which the
generality of suspects choose to exercise“.
20. Acquittal Rates. Chief Commissioner Miller of Victorian Police
Force has argued that a criminal justice system which produces a 50/50
chance of being convicted or acquitted if an accused goes to trial requires
very critical examination. His fundamental position is that:
It is just as much a miscarriage of justice for a guilty man to be
acquitted as for an innocent man to be convicted.”
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This position is similar to that taken by the Criminal Law Revision
Committee in its I lth Report.26 Chief Commissioner Miller in fact advo-
cates the abolition of the adversary system of trial and the substitution
for a system of trial which searches for the truth rather than for proof.27
Mr Peter Sallman has analysed the ﬁgures from the Victorian County
Court in some detail and his analysis of the ﬁgures bears out Commis-
sioner Miller‘s statement that about half ofthose tried by jury are acquit-
ted. Mr Sallman does make the point, however, that only in l972 and
I973 did the acquittal rate exceed 50% and then only very marginally (.l
. and .6) and'that for most of the period the rate was under the 50% level
and in I978 actually dropped to 41.2%.28 Mr Sallman, however, argues
that in looking at the criminal trial system's success in securing convic-
tion, it is important to examine the rate of convictions and acquittals for
all trials including those trials where'an accused person pleads guilty.
Taking this approach, he produced for the period 1972-1979 acquittal
rates ranging between |0.8°/o to l6.5%.29 Commissioner Miller counters
by saying that the fact that most of those who are committed for trial
ultimately plead guilty does not alter the situation that of those who
stand trial approximately 50% are acquitted.30
2|. Is an acquittal rate of 50% excessive? In some cases, the decision of
the accused to go to trial is governed by the gravity of the charge facing
the accused and the likely penalty if convicted. In many cases, however,
the decision to go to trial is based upon an assessment of the Crown case.
If the Crown case is not strong, the decision will be made to go to trial. If
his a strong case, however, there may be much to be gained for the
accused in facing up to that fact and making a plea for leniency
supported by a plea of guilty. Thus many of the cases that go to trial will
be cases in which the evidence against the accused is not strong! It would'
not be surprising, in fact, to ﬁnd that in over 50% of cases that went to
trial, the decision to elect to go to trial was based on the assessment that
the Crown case was not a strong one. Further, if the standard of proof
placed upon the Crown of proof beyond reasonable doubt is to be given
its proper weight, it would be surprising if there was not a signiﬁcant rate
of acquittals in matters that are contested and go to trial. Finally, the
acquittal rate may be inﬂuenced by‘many factors. It may be inﬂuenced
by: , , .
o the complexity of some areas of sophisticated crime, especially cor-
porate crime;
0 the availability and quality of legal representation;
0 the quality, experience and approach of the trial judge;
o the skills of the police;
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o the extent of plea bargaining;
the extent to which charges are included against a particular ac-
cused for tactical reasons to be abandoned or to be withdrawn on
obtaining the plea of guilty or conviction for one or more of the
charges.31
The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Position
22. The Australian Law Reform Commission is not at this stage per-
suaded that the traditional view of the criminal trial should be modiﬁed
to change the balance between the rights of the Crown and the accused.
The view is one Of longstanding. Rules of evidence that result from this
view are seen to perform a vital role in the protection of our liberties. It
has been said that:
There is in the common law a traditional objection to the compul-
sory interrogations. Blackstone explained it: ‘For at the common
law, nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum: and his fault was not to be
wrung out of him, but rather to be discovered by other means and
other men: Comm iv, 296. The continuing regard for this element in -
the lawyer’s notion ofjustice may be, as has been suggested, partly a
consequence of a persistent memory in the common law of hatred
of the Star Chamber and its works. It is linked with the cherished
view of English Lawyers that their methods are more just than are
the inquisitorial procedures of other countries’.32
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden
thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to
prove the prisoner’s guilt . . . No matter what the charge or where
the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove- the guilt of
the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt
to whittle it down can be entertained.”
The privilege against self incrimination has always been as broad as
the mischief against which it seeks to guard . . . As a noble principle
often transcends its origins, the privilege has come rightfully to be
recognised in part as an individual substantive right, ‘a right to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life’ . . . The constitu- .
tional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a govern-
ment must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
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So great is and always has been our horror that a man might be
questioned, forced to speak and perhaps to condemn himself out of
his own mouth, that we grant to every one suspected or accused ofa
crime at the beginning, at every stage and until the very end, the
right 5) say ask me no questions. I shall answer n'one. Prove your
case’.
The second argument was that basically an individual’s rights in the
criminal process had to be related to an understanding of what the
individual’s relationship to government ought to be in a free, demo-
cratic society, and that each step in the criminal process, pre—trial
and trial, including the right of silence, must be judged not as a
means to the goal of achieving a reliable verdict, but also, and
equally important, for its coherence with a liberal understanding of
how free persons, including suspects in the police station, at all
stages ought to be treated.3‘ -
This is an area of such fundamental signiﬁcance to society, that it seems
appropriate to take the position that unless there is a very clear case for
changing the traditional view, it should 'be adhered to by the Commis-
sion. The tentative view ofthe Commission at this stage is that there is no
such case.
23. It is proposed, now to consider the consequences that ﬂow from the
Commission‘s present position on this issue.
Consequences of the Commission’s Position
24. The Commission has identiﬁed the following possible conse-
quences that ﬂow from the traditional view of the criminal trial:
0 Balance of Rights. Any reform of the laws of evidence as they affect
criminal proceedings needs to be looked at in the light of its effect
on the balance between the rights of the Crown and the rights ofthe
accused Reform of the laws of evidence in rape trials raises this
issue
0 Limitations on the Fact Finding Process. The traditional view of the
trial imposes the following limitations upon the presentation of
evidence by the Crown:— ,
0. Best Evidence The laws of evidence should insist on the best
and only the best quality of evidence being adduced against the
accused in criminal trials.
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00 Detailed Rules. Admissibility of evidence led against the ac-
cused in criminal trials should be and be seen to be determined
by a judge applying a detailed rule rather than a broadly de-
scribed discretion, with the attendant risk that evidence of pro-
bative value may be excluded.
0- Right to Cross-Examine. Only in the most exceptional cases
should evidence be admitted against the accused which cannot
be tested by cross-examination.
o The same considerations do not appear to apply to the evidence led
by the accused.
.0 Evidence pointing to innocence. If our priority is to avoid the
conviction of the innocent, then the rules should not be allowed
to prevent probative evidence of innocence being admitted.
This may require a relaxation of the exclusionary rules as ap-
plied to the evidence led by the accused.
Accepting these propositions, there may be little scope for drastic change
to the rules of evidence applying in criminal trials..Accepting the tra-
ditional view of the criminal trial, it would not be appropriate to remove
the accused’s right to silence, the accused’s right to make a submission-of
no case to answer without electing to give evidence, or to totally remove
the accused’s right to cross-examine the rape victim about her prior
sexual history. It does not mean, however, that no reform should be
carried out. It may mean that a more modest approach is required. The
Commission must examine the laws of evidence as applied in criminal
trials to ensure that they do reﬂect and serve the nature and purpose of
the criminal trial and to the extent that they do not, make recommenda-
tion for change. The Commission must:
0 Consider the limitations placed by evidence law on the fact ﬁnding
process.
.0 the hearsay rule which can operate to exclude reliable evidence
which would assist the prosecution or the accused;
u the discretion given to the prosecutor to determine what evi-
dence to lead.
0 Examine those areas where the “balance is at its most delicate.
no evidence of prior misconduct;
0- cross- examination of the accused as to credit;
00 notice of alibi provisions.
In addition the Commission must:
0 Check the assumptions behind the rules with psychological evidence:
00 the effect of bad character evidence;
on the competence of witnesses, old and young;
to identiﬁcation evidence;
0. the effect of stress on observation;
.0 the weaknesses of hearsay evidence.
5|
0 Identi/y areas where it is alleged there are abuses.
u the cross--examination of rape victims abOut prior sexual ex-
perience;
u the complaints about the right to makean unsworn statement
and its use — wild allegations made which would be inadmis- l
sible if made on oath, the making of an unsworn statement and ‘
then the giving'of sworn evidence immediately afterwards, the
carefully settled statement;
00 the giving of false testimony through the use of the “verbal”;
0 Consider the removal of technicalities and complexities.
u the law relating to corroboration;
u the common law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule;
00 the onus of proof on insanity; .
u the cross——examination of the accused as to matters of character;
Conclusion
25. In its attempt to identify the nature and purpose of the criminal
trial, the Commission is attempting to establish a framework of principle
to guide it in its review of the'existing laws of evidence applied in
criminal trials and of criticisms‘of those laws. It will also guide it in
formulating a draft proposal. It is intended that this be the next phase of
the reference. A draft comprehensive proposal will provide a focus for
discussion, enable the Commission to identify the extent to which the
relevant courts should be subject to a comprehensive law of evidence,
enable to view to be formed as to the desirability and feasibility of a
comprehensive law, and, hopefully, resolve debates such as the use of
judicial discretion and the feasibility and desirability of bifurcation be-
tween civil and criminal trials.
26. The matters Canvassed in this paper are canvassed along with other
matters in an issues paper published last year by the Commission. The
Commission is concerned to receive submissions which are addressed to
these fundamental issues lf agreement can be reached on these issues at
the outset the subsequent debate will be able to proceed on a clearly
deﬁned basis.
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Appendix A
Table 3:4 Proportions of defendants making full confessions according
to age .
a. Birmingham cases
 
Age of accused % making full % making full Number
written confession written or verbal of defendants
. confession
Less than 21 39.0 62.2 V 743
21-29 34.1 ’ 47.9 . 913
30-39 . 31.0 34.2 448
40 or over 26.2 32.0 9 206
b. London cases
 
Age of accused % making full % making full Number
written confession written or verbal . of defendants
confession
Less than 21 35.9 57.1 ' 156
21-29 27.8 51.9 158
30-39 23.5 45.9 98
40 or over ’ 19.4 35.5 62
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Appendix B .
Table 3.5 Proportions ofdefendants making full confessions according
to prior criminal record
a. Birmingham cases
 
 
 
Prior record ' % making full % making full Number
written confession ' written or verbal of defendants
, confession
No previous
convictions 38.8 45.| 536
One previous
Conviction 39.7 49.7 290
2-4 previous -
convictions 40.7 A 50.3 604
5 or more previous i
convictions ' , , - 3S.l 49.2 909
b. London cases
Prior record "/0 making full ' > % making full Number
written confession written or verbal , of defendants
confession
No previous
convictions 20.0 36.2 l05
()nc previous
conviction 30.6 5l.0 49
2—4 previous
convictions ' 32.8 56.8 l25
. 5 or more previous
Convictions , 28.3 52.4 l9l
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PRESENTATION oE PAPER
T. H. Smith
I would like to thank the Institute for this opportunity to draw
attentionto the approach the Commission is taking to its Evidence Ref-
crence and the opportunity to obtain your reactions to that approach and
the consequences that the approach has when it comes to reforming the
Laws of Evidence.
You will have noticed from the paper that we have at the outset of
the Reference attempted to canvass what might be called conceptual
issues in the hope that we can establish a framework upon which to build
a draft proposal.
You will see that we have accepted as a starting point a prOposition
that I believe to be trite. You may disillusion me on that point, but the
proposition is that the laws of evidence should serve the nature and
purpose of the criminal trial. On that I think Mr Justice Roden would be
in agreement, and lexpect most of you here also. We'have then at-
tempted to formulate propositions about the nature and purpose of the
criminal trial. I should say that we canvassed those same questions in
relation to the civil trial and the trial system generally in an Issues Paper
prepared and issued late last year. For the purpose of this paper the
discussion is limited to the criminal trial and you will ﬁnd the proposi-
tions set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 in the paper (page 41).
I should add, however, that while it is in our view important to
formulate propositions about the nature and the purpose of the criminal
trial on the basis that the Laws of Evidence should reﬂect and serve them,
it is also true to say that the Laws of Evidence serve other purposes as
well. We have also canvassed this issue in the Issues Paper, suggesting
purposes such as providing the machinery for an adversary system of
trial, controlling the lawyers and the judiciary, and other issues of that
nature. The laws of evidence also serve the function of limiting issues so
that we can limit costs and keep proceedings to a reasonable length of
time.
What I want to talk about this evening is this fundamental question
of the nature and purpose of the criminal trial and the relationship“
between that and the Laws of Evidence. You will see that in the ﬁrst
sentence of paragraph 8 I have dismissed the idea that a trial is a search
for the truth. I emphasise the word “search” and “truth”: Apart from the
fact that in an adversary system of trial the Crown and the accused
control the choice of the evidence presented, I think it can be said, to
quote a leader of the English Criminal Bar with whom you are all famil-
iar, we go to a lot of trouble to “cloud the issues and divert the atten-
tion.“' On anotheroccasion this gentleman described by himself as “An
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Old Bailey hack” asked “Do we ever get a ﬂeeting glimpse of the truth?
Or do we put a hat on the truth and a tie and a serious expression to
please the jury and m’lord the judge?”2
You may recall that Horace Rumpole at the conclusion of that rhetorical
question asked the East Grimble circuit members whether they were
worried about this and he got no answer. I am afraid they were enjoying
their port.
I think we'should be worried about this. I suggest we should be
worried about it. It is very easy to dismiss the proposition that a trial in
our system is a search for the truth. It is argued in the paper that while ,
one cannot categorise a trial as a search for the truth nonetheless it is the
attempt to ﬁnd facts which gives the trial system its acceptability, its
legitimacy if you like, and accordingly we are taking the position that
looking at any of the exclusionary rules of evidence they must justify
themselves. The onus is upon them because they are limiting the evidence
being placed before the court and limiting its fact ﬁnding scope.
I think when you look at some of the cases which upset people, be it
Bedingﬁeld’s case, Jones v Metcalfe, McLean, Sparks, wesee highly rel-
evant evidence being excluded and for that reason the law seems absurd.
When one looks further into the issue however, and considers the nature
and the purpose of the trial we ﬁnd very weighty considerations which
traditionally have justiﬁed us in having exclusionary rules of various
kinds. These have been canvassed to some extent in paragraphs 8 and 9
and have been described, I think perhaps rightly, as the “Civil Liber-
tarian view of the'criminal trial". These considerations have, I suggest,
casued us to place severe limitations on the fact ﬁnding process involved
in a criminal law.
We have had response, as you might expect, to the papers. We have
had a few papers urging us ‘that a trial is a search for the truth and if it is
not, it should be. We have not had, as far as I can recall, any adverse
reaction to the formulation set out in those paragraphs of the traditional
view of the criminal trial. We have had it put to us, however, that we are
wasting our time in canvassing these issues. It has been put to us that we
should get on to speciﬁc issues and not worry about these conceptual
questions. My own view is that if we do not get the conceptual frame-
work right we have no hope of producing an acceptable proposal. If we
do get them right we may not have an acceptable proposal at the end of it
all, but my point is that if we do not get it right, I think that we have no
hope.
I would be interested in the reaction of this meeting to the formula-
tion in those paragraphs and comment on whether you think we are
wasting our time or not.
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To explain' our position further, might I mention some of the
tren'chant criticisms in His Honour‘s paper with a view to drawing your .
attention to the importance of the principles set out in paragraphs 8 and
9 of my paper. These principles, I suggest, lie in the background of most
debates on issues of reform of the law of evidence in‘criminal trials.
There is one principle in particular, and that is theproposition that the
risk of conviction of the innbc‘ent must be minimized even if the guilty bei
acquitted as a result. -
His Honour at (page 14) listed several situations where we ﬁnd ar-
tiﬁcial situations being created by the rules:— the exclusion of evidence
that the jury will know exists, the direction to disregard evidence wrongly
admitted, rules which require a jury to ignore evidence when deciding
one issue but allow the jury to consider it in relation to other issues such
as the perennially difﬁcult problem of the co-accused statement. His
Honour refers to the latter point in more detail on page 19. His Honour
has argued for a need for simpliﬁcation by reform of the rules which .
create these artiﬁcialities, and I think we would all agree that that is a
desirable objective, but I do see a problem.
I would suggest that many of these artiﬁcial situations arise because
of the concern to minimize the risk of convicting the innocent. Thus we .
attempt to keep evidence from the Tribunal of Fact, be it jury or judge or
magistrate, because ‘of the concern that if it is received it may result in the
conviction of someone Who is innocent. The problem, as I see it, is that
ultimately we may have to live with the artiﬁciality. The issue that is '
raised is what weightcare we~ to give to our concern to avoid the convic-
tion of the innocent. The same issue I suggest arises whenﬂone looks at the
Hearsay Rule. The recognition of the same propOsition concerning
minimizing the risk of convicting the innocent is involved and the same
problem of the weight to give it is involved. On page 16 His Honour com-.
menced his remarks on the Hearsay Rule. If you relax the Hearsay Rule
as applied to the Crown evidence it seems a reasonable proposition that
as you do so you may increase the risk of convicting an innocent person.
On the other hand when you look at evidence led by the accused if you
do not relax the rule, as in say Spark’s case or Van Beelen’s case, where a
third party confession to the same crime was held to be not admissible,
you ﬁnd yourself in the position that you are increasing the risk of
convicting someone who is innocent. I am not wishing to say what I
think is right or wrong in this situation. I raise the issue for you and, I
would be interested in your reaction to it.
The problem of the evidence of the accused and the Rule of Hear-
say is a veryimportant one as 'I see it. It can mean that the accused is
prevented from producing evidence which will enable him to raise a
reasonable doubt and it would seem to me that that does ﬂy in the face of
the proposition, if it be accepted, that it is a tenet of our criminal trial
system that we minimize the risk of the conviction of~the.innocent.
I see the same problem in Jones v Metcalfe which His Honour.
referred to. If one gives primacy to the principle, it can be argued that
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that decisiOn is right because the eye witness did not check the note. The
issue arises, “Was the policeman’s note accurate?”. If the eye witness had
checked the note of the car number at the time you could feel happier
about its accuracy. How accurate was the eye witness’s observation of the
car number? That is another problem. Because the eye witness cannot
remember one cannot test that. It is not easy to remember numbers and I
wonder how many of you remember the number that His Honour
quoted. At one stage I remarked to Mr Raeburn that His Honour said
initially, I think, ABC 123. The second or third time His Honour men-'
tioned it I could have sworn he said ADC 123. Ears can play tricks on us
and we can sometimes express ourselves less clearly than we might. The
point I wish to make isthat if one gives primacy to this proposition, that
we must minimize the risk of convicting the innocent, then one, perhaps,
can then live with the Jones v Metcalfe'situation. What I would be inter-
ested in is your views on whether we are correct in adopting the prin-
ciples formulated and what importance should be given to those relevant
propositions.
You will see from the paper (page 42) that we have canvassed the'
question of whether changes should be .made in the traditional view of
the criminal trial. I have set out the position ofthe Commission at
paragraph 22 (page 48) supported by some very ﬁne rhetoric from a
number of distinguished Law Lords and others. I would be interested to
hear any views as to whether we are right in adopting that position. These
issues, as.I say, we see as fundamental and deserve strenuous debate. ‘
The paper then goes on to canvass the topic of the consequences
that ﬂow from the Commission’s position. I draw your attention to the
distinction drawn between propositions which affect the Crown and
propositions as to the approach to the accused’s evidence (paragraph 24
page 49). This highlights the point that I raised earlier, that if one takes
the position that there is a risk of convicting innocent people in our trial
system and that we should minimize that risk and that that should‘be- a
guiding principle, then one can properly distinguish between the position
of the accused and the Crown. That I hope will be a controversial prop-
osition.
If we take what is described as a traditional view, we do end up with
a somewhat constrained approach to reform of criminal evidence law. As
1 see it, if the traditional approach is taken, some issues are not open to
debate, like the Right to Silence. On page 50 I listed a number of
matters which might be thought to be appropriate areas for law reform,
certainly for examination. I would be interested to know if those present
wish to raise any others and I would be interested to know what reforms
you would all like to see in any event.
In conclusion could I say that the views expressed, despite the
dogmatism with which I may have expressed them, are tentative. We, of
course, keep an open mind on these things. I hope that we will receive
some fresh insights into the1ssues that are raised.
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There is undoubtedly a widespread feeling throughout some sections of
the community that many guilty persons, including professional crimi-
nals, are able to take advantage of the rules of evidence in order to gain
unjustified acquittals. Of course, it is virtually impossible to test this
belief in any sort of empirically respectable manner, though this has
scarcely daunted some from attempting such research.‘ Periodically there
are calls for the abolition of such much vaunted protections of the ac-
cused as the right to remain silent (both in and out of court), the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to make an unsworn statement and
the requirement that where appropriate, corroboration warnings be given
and corroboration sought.2
These calls have not gone entirely unheeded. In recent years limits
have been imposed by State Legislatures upon the freedom of counsel for
an accused charged with a sexual offence to cross-examine the complain-
ant at large as to her prior sexual history.3 There are recommendations
afoot from various Law Reform bodies which would have the effect of
rendering more readily admissible confessions which might otherwise be
excluded at common law.“ The future status of unsworn statements is in
doubt.’
A large body of literature has built up around these issues, and the
relative merits of the competing arguments are at least not diﬂicult to
 
l M. Zander, “Are Too Many Professional Criminals Avoiding Con’.
viction?" (I974) 37 Mod. LR. 28. J. A. Mack, “Full-Time Major
Criminals and the Courts" (1976) 39 Mod. L.R.r24l. -
2 .See the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee,
' Evidence (General) 1972, Cmnd 4991; R. Cross, “The Right to
Silence and the Presumption of Innocence — Sacred Cows or Safe-v
guardsof Liberty?“ (1970) ll J.S.P.T.L. 66.
3' 'See for example Evidence Act 1958 (Vic.) 5. 37A, and Evidence Act
I929 (S.A.) s. 34.
4 Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Evi-
dence (General) 1972, Cmnd 499]; but note the views of the New
South Wales Law Reform Commission in its Report on the Rule
Against Hearsay I978, L.R.C. 29 at page 94.
,5 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper,
Unsworn Statements of Accused Persons 1980. The Victorian Law
Reform Commissioner is also examining the question whether to
retain the unsworn statement.
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comprehend. This paper does not concern itself in a direct sense with
'either those issues or arguments. Rather it focuses upon an analogous
problem which has received comparatively less attention in recent years
- the special position of the accused with a prior criminal record.
Evidence that an accused person on trialfor a particular offence has
been convicted of some other offence, or has committed such an offence,
or is of bad character, is as a general ruleinadmissible, at least insofar as
the only relevance of such evidence is its tendency to prove that the
accused has a propensity to commit offences of the type for which he is
on trial.6
Some of the reasons for this rule are obvious. Evidence of this type
is likely to be highly prejudicial. By prejudicial, of course, I mean that
there will be: .
a prejudice additional to or distinct from the detriment to the
accused’s interests involved in the probative force of the evidence.
The prejudicial tendency must outweigh the probative value . . .’ in
the senSe that the jury may attach undue weight to it or use it for
inadmissible purposes’ . .. [such as] those cases in‘which the evi-
dence discloses a criminal record, or conduct or circumstances
which may show the accused in a bad light in relation to matters
which are extraneous to the issues in the case,.or features of the case
which might inﬂame the minds of the jury and thus deﬂect them
from a dispassionate consideration of the issues.7
It is not simply a matter of the jury drawing the inference that a
person who has committed one crime is likely to have committed
another. Evidence that the accused has committed other offences, or is of
bad character, might lead a jury to ﬁnd an accused guilty of the oﬁ‘ence
with which he is charged in part out of a sense that he is deserving of
punishment for those other acts.8 There is also a phenomenon which has
been described som‘eWhat inelegantly as a lowering of the “regret factor”
in convicting an innocent person. A conviction for a serious offence
carries with it more than simply the penalty actually imposed. It attaches
stigma to the convicted person, and may have long lasting repercussions
in terms of employment opportunities and other disabilities. Such “regret
factors” are not present in a situation where the jury is aware that the
'accused is a person who already has a criminal record. The words
“beyond reasonable doubt” could take on a different complexion in
those circumstances.9 There is also some empirical support for the prop-
 
6 This exclusionary rule is often misdescribed as the “similar facts”
rule. In reality the similar facts doctrine consitutes an exception to
the exclusionary rule. ,
7 R. v. Duke (1979) 22 S.A.S.R. 46, at 47 per King CJ.
8 R. Lempert, and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 1977, p.
212. '
9 Ibid.
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(mition that the likelihood of conviction is greatly enhanced where the
accused is known to have prior convictions.'0 ' ‘
Over the years the law of evidence has built up a large body of rules
designed to ensure that, as a general rule, the jury will have no knowledge
of the fact that the accused has prior convictions, or has committed other .
olTences, or is of bad character. Sometimes these are dealt with under the
rubric of the concept of relevance,” on other occasions within the con-
text of the inaptly named similar facts doctrine.‘2 In addition, a body of
legislation had been enacted in every State regulating the position of the
accused as a witness, granting him a “shield” which protects him from
cross—examination as to these prohibited matters, which may be cast
aside ifhis defence is conducted in a particular way.”
In recent years the protection aﬁorded by these rules of evidence
has been eroded to a signiﬁcant degree by certain doubtful developments
in .common law doctrine. A number of these developments have
emanated from the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal. I propose to
examine three recent decisions of that court, each of which deals with an
aspect of the central. theme of this paper.
I Identiﬁcation From Police Photographs 7- R. v. Keeley and
Alexander". ,. '
One of the most salutary and gratifying developments in the law of
evidence in recent years has been the increasing recognition by the courts
of the dangers associated with eye-witness evidence of identiﬁcation.
'This .has culminated in a situation where the requirement that a trial
judge 'warn a jury of the risks of mistaken identiﬁcation has become
peremptory.” Yet comparatively little attention has been devoted to
. what is in many ways an even more fundamental aspect of the whole
problem of identiﬁcation evidence, namely the use of proper pre-trial
 
ll) Doob and Kirshenbaum, “Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect
' of Section, I2 of the Canada‘ Evidence Act Upon an Accused,"
(I972) I5 Crim.L.Q. 88; “Juries and the Rules of Evidence", L.S.E.
Jury Project [I973] Crim.L.R. 208.
l l Lempert'and Saltzburg, op. cit
12 J. Gobbo, D. Byrne,. and J. Heydon, Cross on Evidence (2nd Aust.
ed.) I979 at pl 34l ff. , '
l3 See for example Crimes Act I958 (Vic.) s. 399; Evidence Act 1929
' (SA) 5. l8; Evidence Ac! I906 (W.A.) s. 8; Evidence Act 1977(Qld)
5. I5; Evidence Act I9l0 (Tas.) s. 85. The New South Wales pro-
_visions take a somewhat different form — Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.)
ss.4l3A,4l3B. g '
I4 R. v. Keeley and Alexander [I980] V.R. 571; R. v. Cutajar (12th
December I980, as yet unreported).
l5 R. v. Turnbull[l976] 3 W.L.R. 445.
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identiﬁcation procedures. As the United States Supreme Court observed:
' The trial which might determine the accused’s fate may well not be.
that in the courtroom but at the pre-trial confrontation, with the
State aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and with
little or no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the
witness -— ‘that’s the man’.16
That some form of pre-trial identiﬁcation is desirable cannot be
doubted. What could be less reliable than having the eye-witness make
his ﬁrst identiﬁcation of the accused in court, in the dock?” The more
contemporaneous. the identiﬁcation15 with the offence, the less risk there
is of memory playing tricks. ‘3
It is clear that in ideal circumstances a pre-trial identiﬁcation
should take the form of an identiﬁcation parade. That is not to say that
present practices regarding identiﬁcation parades are themselves ideal. It
would obviously be desirable if the identifying witness did not know that
the person under suspicion by the police was somewhere in that lineup.
This has the effect of making him select from the lineup a person who
most resembles the offender from amongst those present, not someone he
is certain is the oﬂ‘ender.‘9 It would also be desirable that persons selected
to stand in lineups should all be of comparable age and height, and
similar general appearance, and that all lineups were videotaped or at
least photographed.2° But a lineup is vastly better than simply confront-
ing the eye--witness with the suspect alone, and asking, “Is that the
man?"21
Identiﬁcation from photographs in the possession of the police is
most commonly used when they are seeking a lead as to the identity of
 
16 United States v. Wade (l967)y388 US. 218, 235-6.
17 The tendency would be to identify the man in the dock as the
offender if there were any resemblance between the accused man,
and the man seen by the witness. The witness might assume that the
accused must be the oﬁ'ender, otherwise the police would not have
charged him.
18 G. Williams, The Proofof Guilt (3rd ed. 1963) 95-96.
19 G'. Williams and H. Hammelmann, “Identiﬁcation Parades" [1963]
Crim. L. R. 479, 486. The solutionIS the use of “blank” line- ups in
which the suspect is not included as well as those1n which he does
appear. There may be practical difﬁculties1n rounding up sufﬁcient
participants but these could probably be overcome.
20 Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identiﬁcation in Crimi-
nal Cases (1976), known colloquially as the Devlin Report — para
5.66.
21 Davies and Cody v. R. (1937) 57 C.L.R. 17o.
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the person to be apprehended. Where a witness picks out the photograph
ol the accused, the question arises whether at the trial evidence of the out-
ol-court identiﬁcation ought to be received.22
ll is very likely that thejury will infer from the mere fact that his
photograph was in the possession of the police that the accused is known
to the police and probably has prior convictions.23 They may. even infer
that the police would have put their photographs into speciﬁc categories,
and would not for example, have shown the victim of a sexual attack
photographs of known conﬁdence tricksters.“ The photograph itself may
be a classic “mug-shot” of a surly looking person with .front and proﬁle
views, who is holding up a card bearing the particulars of his criminal
record. While the photograph may be “doctored” to eliminate some of
'these collateral matters, there are limits to what can be done in this
respect. It is obviously undesirable to withhold the photograph from the
jury if it formed the basis of the pre-trial identiﬁcation.
Of course, it might be said that the remedy to ensurethat‘such
prejudicial evidence is kept from the jury is to conduct a proper identiﬁ-
cation parade after the accused has been apprehended, and to treat that
as the pre-trial identiﬁcation. However this poses problems of its own.
Assume that the identifying witness picks the accused out of the lineup.
Surely the reliability of any such identiﬁcation must be greatly weakened
by the .fact that the witness has previously seen a photograph of- the
person picked out fofthe lineup.25 There is a risk that the witness is doing .
no more than picking out the accused because he is identiﬁed'not as the
offender, but as the man in the photograph. Transposition of this type is a
recognised psychological phenomenon in cases of identiﬁcation percep-
tion.“ In these circumstances counsel for the accused may be put in the
 
22 There are really two distinct problems here. The ﬁrst is whether
evidence of out-of—court identiﬁcation may be received in circum-
stances where there is no in-court identiﬁcation i.e. whether such
evidence is admitted substantively (as original evidence or as an
exception to the hearsay rule) or merely to bolster credit. See-
‘ D. F. Libling, “Evidence of Past Identiﬁcation” [1977] Crim.L‘.R.
268; and M. Weinberg, “The Admissibility of Out-of-Court Identi-
ﬁcation Evidence in Criminal Cases” (1980) 12 M.U.L.R. 543._ The
second relates to the prejudicial nature of photographic identiﬁca-
tion. See D. F. Libling, “The Use of Photographs for the Purposes
of Identiﬁcation" [I978] Crim.L.R. 343. '
23 R v. Doyle[|967] V..R 698; R. .v. Varley(l9l4) 10 Cr.App..R 125;
' . R. v. Wainwright(l925) 19 Cr.App.R. 52; R. v.Fannon and Walsh
(l922)22$.R. (N.S.W.)427
'24 R. v. Keeley and Alexander[l980j V.R. S71. .
25 Ibid. See also R. v. Seiga (l96‘l)~45 Cr.App.R. 220.
26 G. Williams, The Proofof Guilt (3rd ed. 1963) 99-91.
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invidious position of having to introduce evidence of the photograph
himselfin order to attack the reliability of the lineup identiﬁcation.27
.. These problems are insurmountable. It is clearly desirable that
police use photographs for investigative purposes, and if prejudice
accrues to an accused as a result of this use, it simply cannot be avoided.
A warning to thejury not to draw prejudicial inferences may even cOm-
pound the situation.
An altogether diﬁ‘erent situation presents itself when photographs
are used for identiﬁcation in circumstances where the police are no
longer simply seeking a lead. ThereIS ample authority for the proposition
that photographs should not be used where the accusedis in custody, and
is available for an identiﬁcation parade2” If photographs are used in
such a situation, it is likely that evidence of the pre--trial identiﬁcation
will be excluded in the exercise of the judicial discretion.” It should be
noted that this is not because the probative value of the identiﬁcation
would be outweighed by its likely prejudicial consequences. Rather it is
because the conduct of the police1n using such a mode of identiﬁcation
with all its attendant prejudice, when there was available a non--preju-
dicial form of pre--trial identiﬁcation, would be so reprehensible as to
provide a basis for the exercise of the public interests discretion
enunciated by the High Court1n Bunning v. Cross.3°
In R. vKeeley and Alexander“ the situation which arose fell some-
wherebetween these two extremes. The accused were charged with but-
glary of a bank. Some hours after the burglary had taken place, two men
were seen to leave a motor vehicle which was subsequently linked foren-
sically with the crime. The witness who saw them leave the vehicle was
. shown a folder of police photographs (clearly “mug shots”) and identi-
ﬁed one of the accused from the folder. At the time that the man left the
car it was parked in the vicinity of the home of one of the two accused.
That home, and the home of the other had been under constant surveil-
lance by. the police from the moment that they became aware of the
burglary, and it was common ground that the men (each of whom had
long criminal records) were suspected of involvement right from the
outset. As soon as the identiﬁcation was made from the photograph the
accused were arrested. Even after they had been taken into custody, no
identiﬁcation parade was held, other eye witnesses also making their
identiﬁcation from the folder of police photographs.
At the trial objection was taken to this evidence of pre-trial identiﬁ-
 
27 R. v. Doyle[l967]V.R. 698; R. v. RusseII[l977] N....ZLR 20.
28 R. v. Dwyerand Ferguson[l925]2 K.B. 799; R. v. Haslam(l925) 19
Cr.App.R. 59.
, 29 R. v. Keeley and Alexander[l980] V.R. 571, 583.
30 (1978) 19 A.L.R. 641.
31 [1980] V.R. 571.
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cation. It was submitted that the fact that.a folder of photographs of this
type was produced so swiftly after the burglary would lead the jury to
infer that the accused were men who not only had criminal records, but
also whose records included highly professional burglaries of this type.
The trial judge declined to exercise his discretion to exclude the identiﬁ-
cation evidence, expressing the view that it was possible that the jury
might not draw any inference about the photographs at all.
On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that in forming this
conclusion the trial judge clearly erred.’2 The photographs were obvious-
ly prejudicial. However their probative value was said to be great, and
the error of the trial judge was held not to have vitiated his discretion.” It
was further held that the fact that photographs were shown to other
witnesses after the men were in custody did not call for the exercise ofthe
discretion to exclude their identiﬁcation evidence, since the prejudice
which would ﬂow to the accused had already occurred, and no additional
harm could be done by receiving this evidence.“
With respect, there are propositions here which seem unsound.
Where the police have an obvious'suspect in mind (or even several
obvious suspects) there is no reason why they should not seek to have a
pre-trial identiﬁcation carried out in a non-prejudicial-way, as with an
identiﬁcation parade’5 The suspect can be invited to take part. If he
declines then it is his own misfortune if photographs are used. But he.
ought to be given the opportunity to elect. ‘
The decision that the evidence of those witnesses who made their
identiﬁcations from photographs after the accused were in custody was
admissible, and ought not to have been excluded in the exercise of the
discretion, also seems questionable. True no additional prejudice could
be said to ﬂow to the accused, evidence of the photographs having al-
ready been received. But the Bunning v. Cross“S discretion is a policy
discretion. It does not turn on prejudice or probative value.
The Court of Criminal Appeal expressed some disquiet about the
possible implications of its judgment. It warned:
Nevertheless it should be said here that if a police practice Were to
, develop of using police photographs1n circumstances where it is
practical to hold an identiﬁcation parade, it might be necessary for
the courts to reject evidence of identiﬁcation based on recognition
of a police photograph either because of the prejudice inherent in
the production of police photographs or in order to put a stop to a
 
32 [I980] V.R. 57l, 584;
33 [I980] V.R. 571, 585.
34 Ibid.
35 R. v. Russell[l977] N.Z.L.R. 20.
36 (I978) I9 A.L.R. 641.
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practice which has about it'such an unsavoury and unnecessary
element of unfairness that to countenance it would be likely to
encourage dishonesty and to pollute the stream of justice.”
The practice of making pre--trial identiﬁcations from police photo-
graphsis widespreadin Victoria. The principles laid down1n Keeley and
Alexander may encourage the police to hold off making an arrest, even
when there are grounds for doing so, in order to have the identifying
witness look at photographs rather than a lineup. This would have the
effect of strengthening their chances of gaining a conviction,'through
prejudice. Other jurisdictions have effectively pre-empted this possibility
both through judicial formulation,’8 and legislative regulation’9 The case
of Keeley and Alexander was taken to the High Court1n March 1980. As
of January 1981 it had not yet handed down its judgement.
-2 Evidence of Prior Acts of Misconduct — R. v. Owe j
- Professor Cross formulates the exclusionary rule as follows:
Evidence of the misconduct of a party on other Occasions . . . must
not be given if the only reason why it is relevant is that it shows a
disposition towards wrongdoing in general, or the commission of
the particular crime . .. with which such party is charged, unless
such a disposition is of particular relevance to a matter inissue in
the proceedings as it would be, for example, if it were a disposition
to employ a technique resembling, in signiﬁcant respects, that al-
leged to have been employed on the occasion in question.“0
Unquestionably the most signiﬁcant case dealing with similar fact evi-
dence since Makin v. A.G. for MS. W.“ was the decision of the House of
Lords in D.P.P. v. Boardman.“2 Lord Wilberforce expressed the principles
which govern this area to be as follows:
The basic principle must be that the admission of similar fact evi-
dence (of the kind now in question) is exceptional and requires a
strong degree of probative force. This probative force is derived, if
. at all, from the circumstance that the facts testiﬁed to by the several
witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they -~
must, when judged by experience and common sense, either all be
 
37 [1980]V..R 571,585.
38 R. v Russell[1977]N....ZLR 20.
39 Home Ofﬁce Circular No. 109/1978 ‘Use of Photographs for Identi-
ﬁcation Rules, published in Archbold on Pleading Evidence and
Practice in Criminal Cases (40th ed. 1979) 853 if.
40 Cross on Evidence (4th edition) (1974) p.310.
41 [1894] AC. 57.
42 [1975] AC. 421.
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true, or have arisen from a course common to the witnesses or from
pure coincidence.“3
Lord (ross, after stating the general rule excluding evidence of similar I
lucts stated that:
(ircumstances, however, may arise in which such evidence is so
very relevant that to exclude it would be an affront to common
sense.“ -
Lord Morris put the test this way:
. evidence of similar facts should be excluded unless-such evi-r
dence has a really material bearing on the issues to be decided.‘5
Lord Salmon preferred to saythat similar fact evidence should be
exCluded unless“. .common sense makes it inexplicable on the basis of
c0incidence."‘“‘-
While it is difﬁcult to extract a clear ratio decidendi from Boa'rdman,
what these formulations all have in common is an acceptance of the
proposition that a stronger degree of probative force15 necessary for the
reception of similar fact evidence than for the reception of ordinary
circumstantial evidence. This higher degree of relevance as a threshold
for admissibilityIS required because of the highly prejudicial nature of
evidence of prior acts of misconduct on the part of the accused. Deci-
sions subsequent to Boardmanohrave often preferred to use language such
“strong probative value”,‘7 pr‘osi'tive probative value”48In place of
“striking similarity”, but at worst these reformulations only reduce the
high degree of relevance required as a pre--condition for admissibility.”
‘They certainly do not assimilate that degree of relevance into the ordi- '
nary test for relevance.so
 
"43' [I975]A.C. 421, 444
44‘ [I975] A..C 42l', 456 See also R. v. Kilboumell973]A..C 729.
45 [I975]A..C 42l,436.
46 [|9.75]AC 42!,462
.47 'R v. lnder62 Cr.App.R. 143,148.
48‘ R v. Rance 62 Cr.App.R. 118, 121' R. v. Scar'rott[l978] 1 All EUR
672, 676. .
49 in R. v. Scarrott the Court of Appeal stated:
' Hallowed though by now the phrase ‘strikingly similar’is. i.t
is no more than a label. .Positive probative valueIs whatthe
law requires if similar fact evidence15 to be admissible.
50 For a useful discussion of the concept of relevance see R. v.
_ SIephenson[l976]V. R. 376.
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Their Lordships emphasized that the admissibility of similar fact
evidence depends not, as some of the older authorities and tests sug-
gested,“ upon whether the evidence adduced fell within a recognized
category of admissibility. The “categories” approach was misguided, and
the test in every case was one of whether the evidence was sufficiently
relevant to warrant admissibility.52
The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, in R. v. Chee” took an
entirely different view of the operation of this doctrine. The Court stated:
As at present advised, we are of opinion that it is not a condition of
the admissibility of similar fact evidence, either in general or in
cases where the evidence is tendered in relation to a particular kind
of issue or issues, that the evidence shall have, not merely probative
force (in the sense laid down in R. v. Stephenson [1976] V.R. 376) but
a high degree of probative force.“
This somewhat astonishing proposition was said to be derived from
numerous authorities, including Makin ’v. A.G. for MS. W; 55 Martin v.
Osborne,”6 Markby v. R.,’7 and to be not inconsistent with what was laid
down in Boardman itself. One can perhaps be'forgiven for expressing
consternation at this view, for if the Court ofCriminal Appeal is correct,
virtually every text writer on the law of evidence in the twentieth century
has misread these and numerous other decisions cited in support of Chee.
The court in Chee enunciated its own version of the principles
governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence. This was said to be
“whether it has probative force in relation to some fact in issue”.” In
other words, the ordinary principles of relevance governed the admissi-
bility of this type of evidence. This was made even clearer1n the follow-
ing passage:
If Lord Cross [in Boardman] intended to convey that similar fact
evidence is not admissible unless it is so very relevant that to ex-
 
51 Makin v. A.G. for MS. W. [1894] A.C. 57; cf. Harris v. D.P.P. [1952]
A.C. 694. The chapter dealing with similar fact evidence1n Cross on
Evidence (2nd Aust. edition) 197915 still set outin the form of a
traditional‘‘categories” approach.
52 See the speech of Lord Hailsham at pp. 450—456. See also
L. H. Hoffman, “Similar Facts After Boardman”(l975) 91 L..Q R.
193.
53 [1980] V.R. 303.
54' [1980] V.R. 303, 308.
55 [1894] A.C. 57, 65.
56 (1936) 55' C.L.R. 367, 383
57 (1978) 140 C.L.R. 108.
58 [1980] V.R. 303, 309.
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clude it would be an affront to common sense and if by “an affront
to common sense‘ his Lordship meant more than ‘not sensible,
having regard to the probative force of the evidence’, then, with
great respect, we are not as at present advised in agreement with his
Lordship’s opinion.’9
In the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal, the accused is
adequately protected from the prejudice normally associated with similar
fact evidence by the existence of the exclusionary discretion. The court
observed:
It is difﬁcult to see why, in principle, a stronger degree of probative
force should be necessary for the reception of evidence of similar
facts than for the reception of other circumstantial evidence. True it
is that evidence of similar facts will often be highly prejudicial to
the accused; on the other hand, it will not always'be so, and if Gibbs
A.CJ. [in Markby v. R.] was intending to lay it down in relation to
all kinds of cases that a strong degree of probative force is necessary
for evidence of similar facts to be admissible, the reason for such a ‘
rule of universal application is unlikely to be the highly prejudicial
tendency that will be present in many but by no means all cases.
Probative force can always be weighed against prejudice in the
exercise of the discretion to reject admissible evidence.“
Of course the Court of Criminal Appeal is not strictly bound by.
decisions of the House of'Lords.6| It is bound by the High Court, how-
ever, and it is strongly arguable that the decision in Chee cannot be
reconciled with the earlier decision of the High Court in Markby v. R.“2
lt should be noted that Gibbs .A.C.J. was not alone in Markby. His
judgement was expressly supported by three other members of the Court,
Stephen, Jacobs and Aickin JJ. Gibbs A.C..l. stated:
. .. the admission of Similar fact evidence is the exception rather
than the rule. To be admissible the evidence must have a strong
degree of probative force (per Lord Wilberforce in R. v. Board-
man. . .) or a ‘really material bearing on the issues to be decided’ per
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest. . .; it may not be going too far to say
that it will be admissible only if it is ‘so relevant that to exclude it
would be an affront to common sense’ (see per Lord Cross . . . and
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[I980] V.R. 303, 309.
[I980] V.R. 303, 309. It should perhaps be noted that the Court of
,Criminal Appeal, in relying upon the discretion as an appropriate
. safeguard, omitted to note that the onus lies upon an accused to
6|
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demonstrate why the discretion ought to be exercised in his favour:
R. v. Lee(l950) 82 C.L.R. 133.
R. v. Bugg[l978] V.R. 251.
(1978) 140 C.L.R. 108. .
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per Lord Hailsham) . . . In applying the test practical assistance in
many cases will be obtained by considering whether there 15 a
‘striking similarity’ between the similar facts and the facts in issue.“
This statement of principle formed one of the bases upon which the
application for special leave was granted and a new trial ordered. It was
clearly part of the ratio decidendi of Markby, and constituted virtually
, unqualiﬁed endorsement of the views of their Lordships in Boardman.
Gibbs A.C.J. also spoke to the “exclusionary rule” embodied in Makin v.
A.G. for MS. W.“ This is not the language of ordinary relevance which
was held to be the appropriate test in Chee.
The observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Chee them-
selves amount to mere dicta. It was said:
It is unnecessary for us to express a ﬁnal view of the question
whether ‘probative force’ or on the other hand ‘a strong degree of
probative force’ is necessary before the jury may be permitted to use
the evidence as evidence of similar facts, fOr, in our opinion, the
evidence in this case did possess a strong degree of probative
force. . .65 .
There is no doubt that the evidence in Chee did satisfy the test of
“striking similarity”.°6 It would have been sufﬁcient for the Court of
Criminal Appeal to say so, without engaging in a broad reappraisal of
the foundations of similar fact evidence. It is suggested, with respect, that
the dicta in Chee are per incuriam as inconsistent with the decision in
Markby. It is further suggested that in any event they are erroneous, and
have the effect of substantially eroding the protection of accused persons
who have previously committed other offences.
Itrs gratifying to note that the New South Wales Court of Appeal,
in R. v. Chiron67 recently arrived at a completely orthodox, and it is
submitted, correct conclusion regarding the principles upon which simi-
lar fact evidence is received. In Victoria, there is considerable uncertainty
regarding those principles at present, and some trial judges have taken to
simply ignoring the broader observations of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peal in Chee. It would seem to be highly desirable to clarify the matters in
question, perhaps through the enactment of legislation stipulating the
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64 [1894] AC. 57.
65 [1980] V.R. 303, 310.
66 See D. O’Callaghan, “R. v. Chee”(l980) 12 M.U.L.R. 586.
67 [1980] 1 N.S.W.L.R.218.  
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appropriate test.“ The difﬁculties of arriving at an acceptable statutory
formulation of the similar facts doctrine should not be underestimated,
however. ' '
3 Casting Aside the Accused’s Shield — R. v. Cutajar
Each State has legislation broadly corresponding to the Criminal Evi?
(lance Act l898 (U.K.)."° The accused person who testiﬁes is protected
from cross-examination as to any previous convictions or offences com- ‘
mitted by him, or as to bad character. However this protection may be
lost if he or his counsel makes imputations against any witnesses ‘for the
prosecution, or if he gives evidence of his good character, or if he gives
evidence against any person charged with the same oﬁ‘ence.
'_ Over the years a very considerable body of case law has developed
concerning the construction of the “imputations” component of the rel-
evant section, and also the manner in which the exclusionary discretion
is to be exercised in such cases.70 There is also'some highly signiﬁcant
case law regarding the circumstances in which a co-accused may take
advantage of the legislation to cross-examine the accused as to otherwise
prohibited matters."
There is much less authority on the meaning of the term “good
character".72 What constitutes giving evidence of “good character” with-
in the terms of the legislation? What principles operate'to govern the
manner in which the discretion is exercised in such cases?
In- R. v. Cutajar 7’ the accused was charged under section 233B(1)(d)
of the Customs Act I90l (Cth) with being knowingly concerned in the
importation into Australia of 51.1 grams of heroin. The evidence
adduced for the prosecution was broadly as follows. A parcel sent from
Thailand was opened and inspected by postal authorities, and found to
contain heroin. It was addressed to a ﬁctitious “John Bartolo” at an
address which corresponded to premises occupied by‘friends of the ac-
cused. He had in fact previously received mail from Thailand at'that
address. The parcel was rewrapped by narcotics agents with ﬂour substi-
tuted for the heroin, and delivered tovthe address indicated. Subsequently
 
68 See the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law RevisionCommittee,
Evidence (General) 1972 Cmnd 4991, and the Law Reform Commis-
sion of New South Wales, Working Paper on Evidence ofDisposition
I978 for examples of draft legislation designed to codify the area of
similar fact evidence.
69 See footnote 13 (supra).
70 See for example Dawson v. R. (1961) 106 C.L.R. I; R. v. Brown‘
[I960] V.R. 382.
7| Matusevich v. R. (I977) 15 A.L.R. 117.
72 Malindi v. R. [I967] AC. 439; R. v. Crawford[l965] V.R. 586.
73 '(_l'2th December I980, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal.)
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the accused took possession of the parcel, opened it at a later time, and
hid the contents. He was apprehended by the narcotics officers, and there
was evidence given that he made certain oral admissions regarding his
knowledge that the parcel had been sent for him, and what its contents
would be. In the course of a record of interview, however, he made‘ no
- admissions, and ‘denied having made any previous oral admissions.
The defence was that the accused had not had any knowledge of the
fact that a parcel containing heroin was going to be sent to him. The
accused testiﬁed that prior to 1975 he had never been convicted of any
serious offence. In 1975 he was convicted of a drug offence in Thailand,
and served several yearsrin a Thai gaol. There he became friendly with a
number of Thai prisoners, and did many of them favours, including sup-
plying them with heroin, which he himself was using in considerable
quantities. They had often promised to repay him one day for these
favours.
The parcel arrived about the time of the accused’s birthday. He
testiﬁed that he had suspected that there might be some cannabis in the
package when he received it, but never had the slightest idea that it would
contain a large quantity of heroin. This was said to have been simply an
unsolicited gift from grateful friends. Though its street value in Australia
was certainly enormous (in excess of $100,000), there was some evidence
at the trial that the cost of this quantity of heroin would possibly have
been only a few hundred dollarsin Thailand.
In' the course of his cross-examination, 'the Crown Prosecutor '
sought leave to put to the accused matters which would otherwise be
prohibited, pursuant to s.399(5)(b) Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.). He based his
application upon a claim that the accused had given evidence of “good
character’ within the meaning of the section. He did not indicate speciﬁ-
cally, nor was he asked to indicate, whatparticular line of cross-exmina-
tion he hoped to adopt.
The suggestion that the accused had given evidence of "good
character” had two possible justiﬁcations. First, the accused had testiﬁed ,
in-chief that prior to 1975 he had not been involved in drugs, and had
never been convicted of any serious offence. This evidence had been
elicited as preliminary material to the fact that in 1975 he had been
convicted of a serious drug offence in Thailand. Second, it was suggested
that by virtue of the fact that the accused had himself revealed to the jury
that he had this serious drug conviction, he was impliedly asserting that
this was the full extent and limit of his bad character, which might in fact
amount to an assertion of good character (in a relative sense) if there
were unrevealed material of a damning nature against him.“
Having obtained from the trial judge general permission to cross-
,examme the accused as to bad character, the prosecutor suddenly
 
‘ 74 R. v. Wattam (1952) 36 Cr.App.R. 72; R. v. Thompson [1966] 1 All
‘ ER. 505.
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produced two letters written by the accused from the Thai gaol. In these
letters, which were several years old, the accused had written to a friend
in Melbourne indicating a desire to involve himself in the export of large
quantities of heroin from Thailand to Australia for commerical gain. The
effect of the letters and the cross-examination upon them was undoubted-
ly devastating, and certainly neither counsel for the defence nor the trial
judge had any inkling of their existence, or their intended use.
Upon the application for leave to appeal before the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal it was submitted that the trial judge had erred in granting
leave to the prosecutor to cross- examine the accused as to bad character.
It was argued that the accused had not given evidence of‘‘good charac-
ter‘ within the meaning of s. 399(5)(b), and therefore a precondition for
the grant of any such leave had not been met. It was further argued that
in any event this was clearly a case where the discretion ought to have
been exercised to preclude such cross--examination. These arguments .
were rejected by the court.
it was held that the accused had put his character in issue, and that
an argument that he had really given evidence of bad character was .
misconceived The court stated:
Evidence of good character is evidence that shows, or might show,
that the person to whom the evidence relates is of such disposition
that he would be unlikely to commit the offence in question. Conse-
quently evidence of bad character might be expected to be evidence
that discloses a contrary disposition. Yet this is just what the de-
fence was seeking to maintain that the evidence of drug usage,and
a conviction in connection with that usage, did not establish.7’
This reasoning is highly suspect. The Court correctly stated the
dclinition of “good character” in its ﬁrst sentence, but went on to say that
because the accused’s evidence was not evidence of “bad character” 1n
the converse sense, ex hypothesi it must be evidence of good character.
The mm sequirur is obvious. There1s no onus upon the accused to show
that his evidence was really evidence of bad character, and1n any event
that1s a red herring. The1ssue is whether the Crown haVe shown that the
main 'thrust of the evidence given by the accused is to the effect that he is
of good character so that it is improbable that he committed the olTence
with which he is charged.76
The accused‘s testimony in relation to the fact that prior to 1975 he
had not been using drugs, and had no serious convictions, did not, it is
submitted, put his character in issue in the relevant sense. It was simply
collateral to his evidence that he was convicted of a serious drug offence
in that year. Of course it was an essential part of the defence that this
drug conviction be revealed to the jury, with all the risks of attendant
 
75 Transcript ofthe judgment, page 12.
76 Malindi v. R. [I967] AC. 439; -R. v. Crawford[l965] V.R. 586.
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prejudice. Surely it was permissible for the accused person, without risk
of casting aside his shield, to present a balanced picture to the jury, so
that they would not speculate as to'whether there were in fact numerous
other convictions prior to 1975. Had there been any such convictions, his
denial of their existence could, of course, have been controverted in any
event.
Furthermore it must be doubtful whether an assertion of good
character relating to a period many years before the alleged offence in
question constitutes evidence of “good character” within the section.
The fact that the-vevidence of the drug conviction in 1975 was
necessary to lay a foundation for the defence that the package had been
sent unsolicited, raises the general question of how the discretion ought
to have been exercised in this case.
Courts in Victoria (and other States) have long taken the view that
s.399(5)(b) (and its equivalents) are not to be applied where any imputa-
tions that are made form a necessary part of the defence, and are not
merely collateral and gratuitous.77 The discretion will normally be
exercised in favour of an accused in such circumstances. The English
. approach is, of course, quite different.
The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected a submission that the dis-
. cretion ought to have been exercised in favour of the accused here.
Though they conceded that it was established law that the prosecution
would be permitted to utilise s.399(5)(b) only in exceptional circum-
stances," it was held that such circumstances were present in this case.
The Court did not indicate precisely what those circumstances were.
It is difficult to see how the trial judge’s discretion can be said to
have been properly exercised. The discretion requires him to weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its likely prejudicial conse-
quences. At the time be exercised his discretion the trial judge had no
idea what type of evidence the Crown Prosecutor was seeking to adduce.
Nor did he inquire. How can it be said that the likely prejudicial conse-
quences were taken into account in the equation?
As for the probative value of those letters, it would be easy to
overstate this. Their probative value was not great on the issue of whether
this particular package had been sent to the accused at his request or with
his knowledge. They simply showed that a few years earlier he had
contemplated arranging for heroin to be sent from Thailand to Australia,
in some unspeciﬁed way. If the Crown had sought to adduce these letters
as part of their evidence in-chief (pursuant to the “similar facts” doc-
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78 Transcript of the judgment, page 15.
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trine) it is submitted that the evidence would have been excluded." That
their admissibility should turn upon such a strained interpretation of the
legislation cannot be regarded as satisfactory.
It should be noted that the wording of 5.413 B (1) of the Crimes Act
l9()0 (N.S.W.) (as amended by the Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment)
Act I974 (N.S.W.)) does not resolve these issues.80 Nor does section
I | l(5) (e) ofthe draft bill prepared by the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission appended to its Working Paper on Evidence of Disposition
“978).“I What is required is either judicial recognition that the “good
character" aspect of the legislation should be construed restrictively in
favour of the accused, just as has been the case with the imputations
provision, or redrafting of the legislation to achieve such a result.
 
79 Unless R. v. 'Chee represents good law in Victoria. The Court of
Criminal Appeal in Cutajar referred to the possibilitythat the evi-
dence in question might have been admissible in-chief pursuant to
s.399(5)(a), but did not ﬁnd it necessary to express an opinion on
the matter. See the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal at
page IS.
80 The section provides as follows:
4l3 B (I) In any proceedings an accused person may —
(a) personally or by his counsel ask questions of any witness with
a view to establishing directly or by implication that the ac-
cused15 generally or in a particular respect a person of good
disposition or reputation;
(b) himself give evidence tending to establish directly or by impli- I
cation that the accused15 generally or in a particular respect
such a person; or
(c) call a witness to give any such evidence,
but where any of these things has been done, the prosecution may
call, and any person jointly charged with the accused person may
call, or himself give, evidence to establish that the accused person is
a person of bad disposition or reputation, and the prosecution or
any person so charged may in cross~examining any witness (inclu- '
ding, where he gives evidence, the accused person) ask him, question
with a view to establishing that fact.
8| The draft section would allow evidence of an otherwise prohibited
nature to be received:
(e) where the evidence is relevant to any aspect of the disposition
of the accused person under examination, he having tendered
evidence of his good disposition in that aspect.
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Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
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Firstly l am here to convey the apologies of Mr Weinberg, who
cannot be with you. I confess that I myself cannot do much more than
hold his place on stage; but fortunately the High Court decided the
Alexander appeal before this seminar, so I intend to update his paper by
referring you to the results of that appeal. If you count an appeal to the
Victorian Full Court and an appeal to the High Court as separate in-
stances, Mr Alexander has supplied Mr Weinberg with eights appeals so
far. The latter refers to him as by far his best client, and is waxing fat on
the proceeds.
Mr Smith referred to the possibility of our ears playing us tricks.
With the‘Alexander case,we move into an area where some would main-_
tain that our eyes do nothingbut play us tricks, and it is to cope with the
practical consequences of the explosion of research work in the areaof
observation and perception in the last twenty years that Alexander directs
itself '
Mr Weinberg has, on page 63 drawn your attention to the major
types of “psychological prOblems”, inherent in methods of identiﬁcation
on the dangers that a mi‘sidentiﬁcation will occur, the dangers that an
error will be compounded by the methods used in police investigation
and so forth. He suggests that the problems are insurmountable. I am not
entirely sure myself that “insurmountable” is the right word. I think it is
simply a question of saying the task you have to do is not surmount them,
but draw a line between them.
The interesting thing about the High Court decision1n Alexanderis
the way in which four of the judges (if we assume that Mr Justice Aitken
agreedin this matter with everything that Mr Justice MasOn said) drew
strong distinctions between that aspect of criminal procedure which they
referred to as the “detection process”, and that aspect which they referred
to as “the stage at which the gathering of evidence is involved” — in other
words, after the detection process had ended, Mr Weinberg was un-
fortunately able to persuade only Mr Justice Stephen of the strength of
the points that he was putting to you in his paper and, no doubt at great
length and more forcefully, before" their Honours. He accepted that, if
photographic identiﬁcation methods are used after the detection process
is over, such evidence would always be inadmissible, simply inadmissible
of its nature. If such photographic identiﬁcation methods were used
during the detection process (and I will come in a moment. to when that
begins and ends) then evidence of it might be given at trial, subject
always to the possibility of the exercise of discretion to exclude.
Mr Justice Murphy, while not agreeing with that very strong pos—
ition, took a kind of almost halfway line. He believed that the evidence
.78
‘was admissible, but that in the ordinary' course of events it should always
be excluded by the exercise of the discretion. That is, evidence of the use
of photographic identiﬁcation methods after the period of detection had
ﬁnished. The remaining three judges, the Chief Justice, Sir Garﬁeld
Barwick, and Justices Mason and Aitken (again assuming that Mr Justice
Aitken has agreed with everything that Mr Justice Mason said) believe
that such evidence is admissible and that the discretion would only oper-
ate in the ordinary circumstances in which the discretion to exclude
operates, i.e. where the prejudicial value of the material sought to be put
before the jury far outweighs the probative value of the'material.
The questionarosevery strongly1n this case because of the nature
of the police investigation and the times at which photographic identiﬁ-
cation methods were used. The robbery took place late at night. By early
the next morning, police ofﬁcers were waiting in cars outside the ac-
cused’s house, and one of the photo identiﬁcations was made by a police
ofﬁcer, who was one of the ofﬁcers waiting outside the accused‘s house.
In fact,- Mr Justice Stephen suggests that at no stage in this case was ‘it
- proper for photographic identiﬁcation to be used, because he contended
it was quite clear that, before any conversation with potential witnesses
' or anything of that kind had happened, the police had come to a fairly
ﬁrm conclusion as to who the likely culprit was.
Mr Justice Murphy believed that the dividing line between the
detection process and the “after the detection process” was the taking of
a suspect into custody. He was prepared to concede that there might be
special cases after a person was taken into custody where one would have
to continue using such photographic methods. For instance, where a
person in custody refused to participate in an identiﬁcation parade, or
where he suffered from disability or disﬁgurement that would make the
holding of an identiﬁcation parade just totally meaningless.
Mr Justice Mason thought that there ought not to be a rigid rule
centering on custody. He thought in a sense one ought'not to cut off the
possibility of using photographic identiﬁcation after a person has been
taken into custody. It might be necessary to go on using photographs. He
did disagree quite strongly with the suggestion that is made by Mr
Weinbergin his paper on page 66, i. e. the suggestion that, where police
ofﬁcers have formed a suspicion in their minds as to the inv-olvementby. a
certain person in crime, but they are perhaps not yet ready to arrest that
person, then, if they can lay their hands on him, they can at least invite
him to participate in an identiﬁcation parade rather than submitting
photographs to the witnesses. He did not think that was a particularly
good idea; and, in fact, thought that in a number of instances to do that
would hamper police investigations by putting the suspect on notice. He
did consider that there was an artiﬁcial distinction between the tWO
periods of the investigation; and, in fact, he thought the dividing line was
“that stage at which police ofﬁcers become ﬁrmly suspicious of a particu-
lar person”, and he makes the point that it might then be some weeks
before they might be able to lay their hands on him.  
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The argument that again is present on pages 64 and 65 of Mr
Weinberg’s paper that somehow the Banning v Cross principles could
have some relevance to this situation received unfortunately a very con-
siderable cold shoulder from the High Court. It was only mentiond by
Mr Justice Mason. He rejected the possibility of its relevance in a couple
of sentences. He thought that there was no relevant factor apparent in the
Bunning v Cross decision which should have been and was not applied in
the Alexander trial. But 'he made the point that in Bunning v Cross the ,
evidence was illegally and irregularly obtained, presumably suggesting that,
as there is nothing illegal about showingphotographs to potential witnesses,
the Bunning v Cross principles might not have been applicable in any
case. if that is to be developed it would be an interesting possibility.
In the course of his judgment the Chief Justice, Sir Garﬁeld
Barwick, pointed out that there is no rule in law which requires the
quashing of a conviction simply on the grounds that an identiﬁcation
parade could have been held but was not. Interestingly enough, in 1979
the English Court of Criminal Appeal came to the same decision in a
case called Maynard which is reported in the Criminal Appeal reports.
There is no rule of law that suggests that there must be a follow up
identiﬁcation parade to the" use of photographic identiﬁcation evidence.
The English judges were happy. in Maynard’s case to say that, provided
the jury were given at the trial a warning about the dangers of identiﬁca-
tion consistent with the guidelines laid down in Turnbull’s case in 1976,
then that would be satifactory and, if all other matters indicated that the
trial was fair, there would be no reason for interfering withfthe exercise of
the trial judge’s discretion or quashing the conviction. This is the basic
approach taken by the majority of the High Court judges in Alexander.
The task that they had was simply to look at the whole of the circum-
stances of the trial to see whether, in the whole of the circumstances, it
could'be said that to allow the conviction to stand would be unfair — a
linding that they were not able to make[They also allowed, quite happily,
the admission not only of the evidence of photographic identiﬁcation
methods, but also the photographs themselves as there did not seem to be
anything prejudicial about the photographs used.
it is interesting that this general approach along the idea of fairness,
and presumably warning the jury in accordance with the standard sortof
jury warnings re identiﬁcation, has come out so much in the High Court
and in the English Court of Criminal Appeal in the last couple of years.
One of the points that is made by case after case in this area of identiﬁca-
tion is that sometimes such warnings can be a problem, and particularly
where the warnings are related. to the use of photographs. The problem
that is raised in the paper is‘that if you allow a jury to‘know that an
accused person was identiﬁed by a witness being shown photographs in a
police station by a policeman, the jury will immediately assume that the
police had a copy of the accused‘s photographs because he was well
known to them and in fact had a criminal record. You constantly ﬁnd
what to my mind, are delightful examples of judges, trying to instruct
juries to disregard this possibility by saying, “You must not take into
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account how the police might have come to have had a photograph ofthe
accused. They could have had a photograph for all sorts of reasons” -—
one ofthose delightfully innocent remarks to juries which every juryman
worth his salt who possesses a television set knows is nowhere near the
truth, and that the only reason why the police have a photograph of the
accused is because they know him of old and he probably has a record.
It has been suggested in a number of places that police forces
should equip themselves with photographs of ordinary respectable citi-
zens, and that they should, when using photographic identiﬁcation meth-
ods, draw half from their criminal records and half from their records of
respectable citizens, and it should be made plain to the jury that there is
nothing that can be assumed from the fact that the accused’s photograph
happened to be in the batch. Well, I do not know! Nobody seems to have
taken up the suggestion that police forces should possess ﬁles of photo-
graphs of respectable persons.
But warnings are a problem, because sometimes you will ﬁnd that
to warn a jury about drawing assumptions from the existence of the
photograph is only to emphasise the point that you are trying to get them
to disregard. Chief Justice Bray in Goods case in 1970 in South Australia
referred to the framing of the warning as a Scylla and Charybdis. Still, if
‘ ancient heroes can get through those rocks with the aid of the tail feathers
of birds, I suppose that from time to time modern judges would also be
able to do so!
The elements as I have said in Alexander’s case are elements of
fairness. I suppose that the distinction drawn by the High Court between
the two periods, that is the period of detection and the period of evidence
accumulation, is perhaps simply an example of the fact that fairness
varies with context. But it is also an example of one other factor, and that
is the dangerous line that we walk along all the time between the kinds of
concerns that have already been expressed at this seminar — that is the
concern that the innocent shall not suffer from our criminal justice sys-
tem, the concern for the rights of accused persons whether they be inno-
cent or guilty, the concern for fairness in the activities of our public
institutions — as against the effectiveness of the actions of those public
institutions. The point made by Mr Weinberg on page 63 is, if one took
one side of that to its logical extreme, you might well reach a conclusion
where you could say with some justiﬁcation that you ought never to show
a potential witness a photograph of somebody who might turn out to be
the accused, because this would either so prejudice him against the man
or would so ﬁx the photograph’s face in his mind, that he might be
incapable thereafter of a proper identiﬁcation. One could quite easily
take the psychologists’ work in this area and the arguments made to that
conclusion, and you would have a situation where you would hobble the
police force.
It is not only a question of fairness, but a question of at what point
do we divide the values that we are endeavouring to achieve within a
single framework, values which might in their practical application be in-
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consistent. That is why I began by saying I am not so sure that our task is
to cope with the problems that might appear to be insurmountable, our
task is to cope with problems where we have to draw a line between them
and perhaps just disregard their insurmountability.
 DISCUSSION PAPER
THE ACCUSATORY SYSTEM v. THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM:
PROCEDURAL TRUTH v. FACT?
Dr G. L. Certoma.
Lecturer in Law,
The University of Sydney.
I. General
The observations made by His Honour Mr Justice Roden in the
introduction to his paper, “Criminal Evidence — the Law and the
Gobbledegook“ must be considered the starting point in any serious
discussion on the reform of the law of criminal evidence.
The subject must be considered 'on a more general plane than it is
sometimes viewed, in two different senses. First, the problem of criminal
evidence law reform must contemporaneously involve a discussion of
criminal procedure. Criminal procedure and criminal evidence serve the
one and same purpose: the pursuit of truth. The criminal process, using
the phrase in its wider sense as inclusive of both criminal procedure and
criminal evidence, is the vehicle utilised in the determination of whether
there has been a violation of the substantive criminal law, a determina-
tion which may carry With it serious consequences for the subjectwho is
at risk. In other words, it is the process utilised in determining whether it
is justiﬁed to impose a penal sanction against an otherwise free subject.
Therefore, in the ﬁrst place it must be determined how well criminal
. procedure and criminal evidence serve the purpose for which they are
intended, namely, the pursuit of truth. Or indeed, whether this is in fact
the principal end to be served by the criminal process. ’
Second, piecemeal and ad hoc reforms serve only to make the sys-
tem more complex. The law reformer must, at least initially, not take too
parochial or conservative an approach. It may well be that in all the
circumstances, in the present socio-institutional frameWork an overall
reform is not possible, or it may even be that an overall reform is inad-
v'isable and inappropriate. Nonetheless, an inquiry from a more general
perspective helpsIn the identiﬁcation of the basicIssues and a complete
rc- eva|uation of the individual institutions, including an appreciation of
their historical origin, their purpose, both past and present, and their
continued relevance. This is where the contribution of Comparative Law
. may be valuable: Comparative Law will readily indicate alternative
styles, their effectiveness, highlight basic and common issues and provide
a yardstick with which to assess our own system.
It is upon these bases that this paper will proceed.
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2. The Accusatory and Inquisitorial Systems: Fact-ﬁnding Styles
Compared.
(a) Deﬁnition
An accusatory system is essentially a party process. It involves a
two sided contest, between prosecution and defendant, in a judicial
arena. The parties are in an equal position with an impartial moderator,
the judge. The judge does not have any initiative in the collection of the
evidence which is exclusively in the hands of the parties, chieﬂy with the
prosecution. The proceedings are oral, open to the public and the evi-
dence is mainly tendered by direct examination of witnesses with a right
of cross examination by the oppdsite party. Historically the accusatory .
system is tied to the popular juries which give unreas‘oned verdicts.
On the other hand, the inquisitorial system is mainly typiﬁed by two
basic factors: ﬁrst, the concentration of several functions in the one
person as the judge in an inquisitorial system is both judge and prosecu-
tor; second, the collection of evidence in an inquisitorial system is in the
control of the judge, not the parties, and he initiates the investigation and
collects all of the evidence.
(b) Does there exist a pure accusatorial or inquisitorial system?
In no country today does there exist a pure accusatorial or a pure
inquisitorial system, but it is true to say_that common law countries
follow a procedure inspired by the accusatorial tradition and the civil
' law countries have a structurewhich tends towards the inquisitorial
tradition.
(c) Which system is to be preferred?
Both systems have advantages and both have defects. However, in
. general, the accusatorial system seems to be more sensitive to the liberty
of the citizen whilst the inquisitorial system places more emphasis on
ensuring the punishment of a guilty party. It is clear that a zealous
pursuit of the inquisitorial approach would erode the freedom of the
citizen. It is the delicate balance between discovery of the facts at any
cost on the one hand and considerations for basic and fundamental
rights of the citizen on the other that explains why a pure inquisitorial or
accusatorial system is not to be found. This balance is an important
consideration in any debate 'on‘criminal procedure'and criminal
evidence law reform.
3. An Alternative Fact-ﬁnding Style: The Non-Accusatory System
(a) The ordinary criminal process in a civil law country
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To take Italy as a typical civil law country, the ordinary criminal
process is divided into three broad phases:
(i)
(ii)
the pre—instruction phase. This phase is brief in content and does not '
form part of the judicial proceedings. It merely comprises the pre-
liminary investigation by the judicial police or prosecution to ascer-
tain whether there has been a genuine complaint in the sense that
there has been the commission of a crime. The outcome of this
phase is either that the complaint is founded in which the case the
criminal process is initiated and the case will pass into the next
phaseIn the process, or that the complaintIS unfounded1n which ,
case an examining judge must make the appropriate order before
the ﬁle can be closed. The latter is a consequence of the rule of
obligatory prosecution in all crimes coming to the notice of the
authorities.
the instruction phase. This is part of the judicial proceedings and, in
practice, has become the most important phase in the criminal pro-
cess. This phase comprises the investigation and collection of all the
evidence culminating with a decision as to whether there is suf-
ficient evidence to put the accused on trial or, in other words,
whether to initiate the third and ﬁnal phase in the criminal. process.
All crimes which come within the jurisdiction of the Corte d’assise
or the tribunale (the higher courts in the heirarchy) must proceed by
way of a formal instruction which is conducted by an examining
judge. Crimes which come within the jurisdiction of the pretura (the
lowest court in the hierarchy),5that is, crimes which carry a penalty
of not more than three years imprisonment or ﬁne only or ﬁne
together with not more than three years of imprisonment, must
generally proceed by Way of a summary instruction whichIS con-
ducted by the prosecutor
The characteristic features of this phase are that the proceedings are
written and secret, although the defendant or his attorney can be
present at most of the proceedings. The examining judge or pros-
ecutor (whichever is relevant) has full control over the proceedings
and the investigation and collection of evidence including the call-
ing and examination of witnesses and the employment of experts.
There is no cross-examination although the parties may submit
written questions to the examiningjudge requesting that they be put
to the witness. The examining judge is assisted in his task by the
judicial police The examining judge will normally wind up the '
instruction phase at the point at which he considers he has all the
relevant facts
At the conclusion of the instruction phase, in the case of a formal
instruction the examining judge either decides that there is sufﬁcient
evidence to put the accused on trial and orders accordingly, or that
there is insufﬁcient evidence and acquits the accused. In the case of
a summary instruction, if the prosecution decides that there is suf-
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(iii)
0))
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ﬁcient evidence to put the accused on trial, it requests the trial judge
to make the appropriate order; if instead the prosecution decides to
acquit, the order is sought from an examining judge.
the trial phase. This consists of open proceedings. Theoretically the
trial phase is characterised by orality and immediacy but in practice
it has degenerated into a mere formal reception of the written
summaries of the evidence collected in the previous instruction
phase, rather than retaking the evidence orally in open court.
Therefore, in practice, the criminal process consists of a cumulative
series of activities «all of which are utilised by the trial judge in
making the ﬁnal decision.
Special Procedures
The normal criminal process just described is in some instances
varied. The two most important of such variations are:
(i)
(ii)
the procedimento pretorile. This is the procedure followed in the
pretura (the lowest of the criminal courts in the heirarchy) which has
jurisdiction only in minor criminal matters. This procedure is the
same as the ordinary criminal process except that the judge apart
from having full control over the collection of evidence also exer-
cises the functions of prosecutor and adjudicator. This is the only
example of a true inquisitorial court in Italy today. It seems that it
only continues to survive because of practical considerations such
as Court facilities, stafﬁng problems and the wage bills involved in
introducing the normal criminal process in the case of petty crimes.
Moreover, in those cases where the penalty consists of a ﬁne only or
a ﬁne and detention which is remitted to a ﬁne only, and certain
other conditions are met, the pretore may, as an economy measure,
enter a judgment without proceeding to. a trial. If the person so
convicted considers the decision unjust or illegal he may requisition
a trial ex postfacto and oppose the decision.
the ”giudizio direttissimo”. In the case of more serious crimes this
represents a means of by—passing the instruction phase. This proce-
dure is generally appliCable where the accused is apprehended
during the commission of the crime. In such a case the matter goes
directly to the trial phase, by-passing the instruction phase, on the
basis that there is sufﬁcient evidence to put the accused at risk. This
procedure can also serve an exemplary function, it being indicative
of a readiness on the part of the authorities to act swiftly in dealing
with certain types of criminality. For this reason the procedure was
made applicable to certain deﬁned crimes in the mid-seventies.
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4. The Law of Evidence
(a) Fact adducemenr: Procedural Truth v. Fact
It is apparent from what‘has already been said that whilst the common
law criminal process, embodying party evidence, elaborate exclusionary
rules and other rules of evidence, is; characterised as a system tending to
procedural Iruth, the civil law systems strive to ensure a complete and
factual judicial inquiry. The common law seeks truth as the product of
collaboration between the parties; the civil law places the pursuit of truth
in the control of a judge who has the initiative in collecting all the
material he needs to decide the matter and thus is not bound by the
evidence tendered to him by the parties. Therefore, evidence damaging to
the accused is not only brought forward by the prosecution but also by
thejudge; and, similarly, evidence favouring the accused not only comes
from the defendant, but also from the judge.
(b) ' Admission and evaluation of evidence
(i) General. The operative principle with regard to the admission and
eVaIuation of evidence in criminal trials is the free evaluation of
evidence or “free proof ’. This means that the evidence may be
weighed by the judge freely in accordance with his prudent judg-
ment. In the system of legal proof, by way of contrast, the law
rigidly determines the evidence. to be admitted and the weight it
must be given. The system of legal proof with its mechanical stan-
dards was the product of an age when it was considered dangerous
to subject an accused‘to a judiciary which was not independent
from other powers of the State nor, in many cases, legally trained.
The principle of free evaluation of evidence has its origins in The
French Revolution which exploited the institution of the jury. Tra-
ditionally the jury gave an unreasoned verdict reached on the basis
of an “intimate conviction”of the facts presented to it. The principle
of free evaluation of evidence derived from the principle of “inti-
mate conviction” but is different to its forerunner because the de-
cision, the result of the free evaluation of the evidence, must be
supported by a reasoned judgment.
The principle of free evaluation of evidence is seen to constitute not
only a freedom in favour ofthe judge, namely, the freedom to apply
his prudent judgment to the facts of the case at hand, but also as an
advantage operating in favour of the accused who will know that
thejudge will not be restricted in his evaluation of the facts and can
decide the case having regard to the accused’s own circumstances.
The Italian judiciary having thus achieved this full and uncon-
trolled power over evidence, has proceeded to use the principle of
free evaluation of evidence to justify a probing into any sort of
evidence, even to the point that the judges now ignore any ex-
clusionary rules contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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(ii)
Taking the principle of free evaluation to its logical but extreme
conclusion the judges contend that even if the collection of certain
evidence does not comply with certain procedures or other require-
ments prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court may
nonetheless utilise the evidence and evaluate and convince itself of
its probative value. For example, there is a speciﬁc rule in the Code
of Criminal Procedure which provides that the judge, before admit-
ting evidence of identiﬁcation as a result of a line-up, must ,ascer-
tain if the witness has seen a photograph of the person to be identi-
ﬁed. Therefore one would think that if the witness has seen a photo-
graph, the judge would exclude the evidence. However, the Court of
Cassation has often said that the judge will be free to convince
himself of the weight to be given to such evidence, even if that
evidence is excluded by some rule in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure.
In conclusion, the principle of free evaluation means in substance:
ﬁrst, full freedom to admit evidence even if it is speciﬁcally
excluded by some Code provision; second, the right to inquire into
atypical forms of evidence, that is to say, forms of evidence not
considered by the law as desirable, e.g., reading the police ﬁle; and
thirdly, the free evaluation ofall evidence.
Whether this state of affairs will be considered satisfactory will
depend upon two factors: how far the legal system considers de-
sirable a full and complete inquiry, and the degree of conﬁdence
which the legal system is prepared to place in its judges delving into
and weighing freely all the facts of the case. The only hesitation
which appears in Italyis the judges’ failure to respect an express
prohibition regarding the admissibility of evidence.
It is also important to emphasise that in Italian law there are no
exclusionary rules of evidence such as our hearsay rules. There are
only some explicit rules going to the admission of particular sorts of
evidence, for example: A349 Code of Criminal Procedure which
prevents a witness expressing personal opinions or appraisals. on
the morality of the accused; A.l4l Code of Criminal Procedure
which provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the court cannot
admit anonymous writings; and A348 Code of Criminal Procedure
which places restrictions on taking evidence from a co-accused.
The diﬂerent classes of evidence in Italian Law. The various
categories of evidence in Italian law are —
1. Inspections, domiciliary or corporal. This is a means of
ﬁnding clues and establishing the physical and material effects
of the crime.
2. Searches, domicilary or corporal, which are conducted when
the examining judge believes or suspects that things pertinent
to the crime are to be found in a given locality or that a suspect
or other person may be found on searching the locality. Simi-
 
3.
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larly, bodily searches can be conducted When the examining
judge believes or suspects that there are things on the person
pertaining to the crime.
Judicial Experiment which constitutes the re- enactment or re-
L
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construction of a given situation to establish veracity or simi-
larity.
S__equestrat_ion of property relevant to the crime. ThisIs usually
the consequence of a search.
~__.l:i_ne-_u_pufor identiﬁcation purposes.
Confrontation. Where there is a discrepancy in the declar-
ations given by different persons pursuant to either an examin-
ation or interrogation, the examining judge may order a con-
frontation.
Testimony. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
examining-judge must examine all persons having knowledge
of facts pertaining’to the case in question and which the
examining judge considers useful in ascertaining the truth.
This means that every person with knowledge of the facts may
. be a witness; that the purpose of testimony, as well as criminal
proceedings generally, is ascertaining the truth; and that the
judge is obliged to examine those persons with a knowledge of
the facts, the only exception being those persons whose testi-
mony the examining judge considers not to be useful to the
case.
Persons incompetent to give evidence are persons who donot _
understand the gravity of false testimony and persons connec-
ted with the proceedings, e.g., the judge and court ofﬁcials.
Competent but not compellable witnesses include family of
the accused, ﬁduciaries (such as lawyers and doctors) who
enjoy professional privilege, public officials who have learnt
of the facts in the course of their employment, and persons
affected with State privilege.
Expert _ev1_d_en_ce_. Experts are not so much regarded as
witnesses but as collaborators with the judge. Expert evidence
is ordered by the examining judge to assist in scientiﬁc mat-
ters. The judge must resort to experts when the inquiry in-
volves matters which are not in the normal cognitive powers of
the judge. This obligation on the judge does not arise only in
the case of a technical inquiry, but also in the case of a difﬁcult
inquiry which may require special knowledge.
Interrogation fof the accused. In Italian law the interrogation
 
serves several functions. First, it makes known to the accused
the charge. Second, it is a means of defence in that unless the
accused has knowledge of the charge he cannot defend him-
’90
self. It is for these two reasons that the interrogation of the
accused is an obligatory part of the criminal process and takes
place at the start of the instruction phase. Third, the interroga-
tion can also serve as a source of evidence in the sense that the
judge may deduce matters which will assist him in his ﬁndings.
Moreover, the judge invites the accused to defend himself or
raise any matters he wishes to in his defence. The defendant,
of course, has the right to remain silent except for the indica-
tion of certain generalia e.g., his name.
It may be opportune to note that confessions are regarded by
Italian'law with suspicion. A confession per se is not con-
sidered as sufﬁcient proof; The judge must be cautious in
evaluating a confession which even if not the product of exter- '
nal pressure, may be insincere for many diverse reasons, not
least of all pathological reasons. In every case, a confession
before it can have any evidentiary value must be corroborated
by other objective ﬁndings which conﬁrm its truthfulness as
well as its genuineness and spontaneity.
' Conclusion _
General
1. Those legal systems tending to the inquisitorial strive for an
objective, truthful and complete account of the facts. Those
legal systems tending to the accusatorial rather seek truth as a
product of the collaboration between the parties to the pro-
ceedings.
It is apparent that the more extreme the inquisitorial objective,
the less sensitive the system becomes with regard to personal
and civil rights.
Therefore, there has to be a balance between the pursuit of
truth and a respect for basic personal and civil rights. For this
reason, no system can today be said to be purely inquisitorial
or purely accusatorial.
The non-'accusatorial system
4. The investigation process in the non-a-ccusatorial system is
conducted by the judiciary.
Thejudiciary enjoys the initiative and control over the collec-
tion of evidence as well as a complete freedom over its
admissibility and evaluation. .
There are no exclusionary rules such as the hearsay rule. The
only practical bar to the admissibility of evidence is relevance. -
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The comparatively small number of norms prohibiting the
admission of particular types of evidence are generally
ignoredIn practice and the judges use their prudent judgment
in deciding upon the weight to be attributed to the otherwise
inadmissible evidence.
No more apparent injustice seems to be produced by the in-
quisitorial system than by the accusatorial system.
(:5. Reform
9. Any discussion concerning criminal evidence law reform
needs to be on a wider and higher plane than the level ofthe
individual rules of evidence. Whilst foreign processes may not
always be the answer, theirdiscussion‘will assist in the identiﬁ-
cation of basic issues, the isolation of fundamental institutions
indispensable to our system of law, and give us the beneﬁt of
foreign experiences. '
The term “Wider plane” is used to convey the idea that crimiv
nal evidence and criminal procedure must be considered
together. Some evidentiary elements of the “inquisitorial” sys-
tem,can easily be accommodated within the existing accusa-
3tory framework, e.g., judicial initiative in calling witnesses.
However, more far reaching reforms such as the abolition of
the Hearsay Rule will necessitate a re- evaluation of criminal
procedure generally For instance, the question will arise as to
whether the abolition of the exclusionary rules of evidence15
compatible with thejury system. In Italy, where there are no
exclusionary rules, there is no jury as we understand it and
popular participation is restricted to the Corte d’assise where it
is in the form of a college of eight, two career judges and six '
laymen, who together decide law and fact and-must give
reasoned judgments.
The term “higher plane” is used to convey the idea that the
general purposes of the law of evidence must be considered
before particular rules of evidence can be reformed or new
rules introduced
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr. G. L. Certoma
I wish to mention the two reasons which inspired me to write this
brief submission, both reasons coming out of some comparative work.
The ﬁrst one is that I feel that considerations of law reform should begin
at a higher and wider level than is normally the case. On a wider level to
include criminal procedure as well, and on a higher level in the sense that
we should lift ourselves above the invidivual rules of evidence and con-
sider the whole problem from the point of view of the purpose of the law
of evidence so that we do not easily succumb to create more rules, more
exceptions, which only in the end serve to make the system more com-
plex and perhaps more unjust. The second reason that inspired me to
write the paper was merely to show that in one of these so called “inquisi-
torial systems” there is a situation where‘the value that the law of evi-
dence is not to act as, to use the words of Mr Justice Roden, “a block out"
is emulated. In the Italian legal system the Tribunal of Fact can consider
all the material which comes before it in its search for the truth and it
appears to me that no patent injustice has arisen out of that.
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DISCUSSION
His Honour Judge R. F. Loveday, Q. C, a Judge of the District Court of
New South Wales. ‘
First of all I would like to congratulate His HonourJudge Roden
and the other persons who contributed these papers but it is particularly
to Judge Roden'5 paper that I wish to make comment. I think that the
author of the paper should be congratulated, not only because I agree
with what he says but for the quality of the paper itself. In particular, I
applaud his statement to the effect that rules providing for exclusion
rather than the admission of evidence need to be justiﬁed. Any sugges-
tion, for amendment to the rules of evidence13 likely to be met, so far as
lawyers are concerned, by references to the great traditions of English
law; any change is an attack on those'traditions and it is inevitable that
any suggestion for reform or amendment be opposed. It might be thought
that law reformers are more open minded than others, but I well remem-
ber the stir that I caused in the NSW Law Reform Commission when I
proposed that the Commission recommend the abolition of the Rule
against Hearsay rather than increase the number of exceptions to it.
The arguments that are usually submitted in favour of the Rule
include a prediction that abolition would open the ﬂoodgates to irrel-
cvant and unreliable material.
The ﬂoodgates argument was, as I remember it, put very forcefully
in 0 "C0nn0r3 case in the High Court as a reason for following Majewski.
l have been sitting in criminal trials almost every day since then, and l
have had one case only1n which drunkenness was raised as an 0 'Connor
defence and it failed So much for those ﬂoodgates.
' l am'not aware of any downgrading of justice in England in civil .
actions since I968 as the result of the reversal of the hearsay rule since
I968.
To the argument that we would be introducing irrelevant unreliable
material I say that ifthe matter is irrelevant it should be excluded for that
reason but not because it is hearsay. The question of whether or not it is
unreliable is surely a question of fact for the judgment of the Tribunal of
Fact. As His Honour said it is the jury’s task to assess the weight of any
piece of evidence and I cannot imagine any better body of men to assess
whether or not a piece of evidence should be excluded from considera-
tion as gossip or whether it should be regarded as something which they .
should rely on.
It is understandable I suppose that we should be wary of interfering
with a rule that has stood so long. In this respect I think we can take some
heart from legal systems other than those which have adopted the Com-
mon Law. As Dr Certoma points out the Rule does not exist in Italy nor
in any other system in the world that I am aware of. They all seem to be
able to manage quite well without it
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I ask everyone concerned to consider whether the rule can really
justify itself on any basis. If not it should be abolished altogether rather
than just curtailed by adding to its exceptions.
Dr F. W. Wright-ShorthConsultant Psychiatrist
It is with some difﬁdence that I speak in a situation like this, but
there might be some comment in relation to evidence which I can make
as one who gives it very frequently under the guise of an expert.
One of the problems in giving expert evidence, particularly psychi-
atric evidence, is that questions are asked in one universe of discourse
and have to be replied to in another. The legal connotation of a word
might be quite different from that to which one is accustomed in ordinary
English, two words in point are “fact” and “proof". It seems to me that
the suggestion that a trial might be an enquiry into the guilt or innocence
of the accused rather than the present trial by combat would be possibly a
means whereby medical and legal people might understand one another
better.
One is asked for instance “Did a man know what he did ?”. Now, to
me if you are to know something you must be in a position to recollect it,
so the reply to that strictly should be if amnesia is claimed, as indeed it
may well be, “He may have known what he did at the time but he does
not know now”. This is not the sort of reply that pleases counsel.
“Automatism” is raised in psychiatric matters — a word that seems
to have a special meaning in law but its actual meaning is “automatic acts
which can only be accepted as such if they are stereotyped and if they are
repetitive", otherwise automatism is nonsense. It seems to me that one of
the most important things that I am glad to see mentioned in one of the
papers is that trials for rape should be modiﬁed in some way so.that the
victim is not pilloried. Many have told me that the trial was far worse
than the experience.
The lawyer looks for a precise statement which unfortunately the
expert witness, particularly the psychiatrist, frequently cannot oﬁ‘er him.
It is easy for the lawyer because he achieves precision within a formal
system and, of course, a psychiatrist has no such comfortable constraints.
All that I am really trying to say is that the expert witness, particularly the
psychiatrist, can all too often be driven into a corner by being asked to
answer unanswerable questions and it may be that some modiﬁcations of
the rules of evidence that the Commission is considering might perhaps
‘ be helpful to this end. .
G. D. Woods, Public Defender; Director, Criminal Law Review Division.
. Dr Wright-Short made mention in his comment that he had heard it
said that trials of rape should be modiﬁed so that the victim will not be
pilloried. Legislation which has recently been enacted by the N.S.W.
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Parliament and which will commence to operate (1 should imagine)
somewhere around July or August ofthis year, upon a date which has not
yet been set, will have that effect. I relate it to what has been said by His
Honour Mr Justice Roden in his very comprehensive and analytical
paper as to the function ofthe law of evidence as excluding material. It is
indeed the case that much of the law of evidence, as we know it in
criminal trials, operates to exclude material which we believe would be
prejudicial or disadvantageous in arriving at the truth.
Section 4098 of the new Crimes Act and s.409C will have the effect
of excluding a lot of evidence which is presently admissible, either by
way of evidence, or as material admissible in a statement from the dock.
The purpose of that exclusion is to prevent the tribunal which makes the
decision about the facts from being inﬂuenced or swayed by material
which it is thought is inapposite. I appreciate very much that decision
making on facts is indeed the function of the jury. His Honour Judge
Loveday said “there is no better body of men than this” (I should im-
agine that there are a number of women in the audience who might take-
exception to that expression and I am certain that Judge Loveday did not
intend it in a sexist sense). But the jury has the function of deciding the
facts of the case on the‘basis of material put to it which the law regards as
being appropriate to the circumstances of the case.
I am sure that we all know of decisions that are made in our daily
lives which are based upon material which is really not revelant to the
decision, and I talk about disputes of various kinds that occur in the
domestic situation, disputes that occur in the workplace — there is none
of us, I am certain, who is not familiar with the situation of a dispute
arising in the workplace being determined upon anything but rational
lines and entirely by reference to material quite irrelevant to the true
merits of the matter before the determiners of the facts. In any event, the
legislation which is contained in ss.409B and 409C ofthe Crimes (Sexual
Assault) Amendment Act will exclude from the jury material which con-
sists of evidence or cross-examination or unsworn statement material
relating to prior sexual behaviour of the complainant in a sexual assault
trial.
When this matter recently came before Parliament it was the subject
of some comment by the Bar, Council — the very evening before the
matter went into Parliament. The President of the Bar Council saw ﬁt to,
make the comment the following day that the effect of this exclusion
might be to put innocent men in gaol. That was not the view of the
legislature and indeed it would appear that it is not the view of that
proportion of the population which consists of females. By and large
women seem to have accepted the exclusion of that sort of material from
the jury as being right and proper.
It remains to be seen how those provisions (5.4093 and s.409C)
operate in practice, but my view is that those provisions are, so far as can
be ascertained at the presenttime, fair and reasonable. They exclude
from the sexual assault trial the standard type of defence based upon the
accused standing up in the dock and saying “She was a slut. She slept
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complainant in a sexual case about her sexual history. Time was, many,
many years ago, when the view was widely held that if a woman was
“immoral” she would be less likely to be telling the truth. So the law
allowed her to be cross-examined as to her alleged immorality because it
went to credit. It is a long, long time since people have believed that
women who indulge in extra-marital sexual intercourse are by that
reason less likely to tell the truth. Therefore, it is a long, long time since
such cross-examination ought to have been allowed. It was allowed be-
cause of the habit of the law of looking at the words in rules rather than
the principle behind the words. All that is being done, as I understand it,
by ss. 409 B and C is that the relevancy rule is being given primacy. And
the object in any event, as I understand it, is not to control the material
that will get' before the jury, but rather to protect the witness; and that
seems to me to be an entirely different situation from that which we are
discussing. ‘
One of the problems that we face with this sort of reference is that
you could devise empirical research on every topic if you wanted to. One
with everybody. She slept with my mates, Tom, Dick and Harry, and I
thought she would consent to sleeping with me”. That sort of material
which forms, as it were, the standard rape defence at the present time —-
certainly in most cases involving multiple defendants — will be largely
excluded, except to the extent that it is relevant within certain deﬁned
exceptions. That is, it is part of the res gestae, or it relates to sexual
connection between the accused and the complainant, and so on. There
are a number of deﬁned exceptions.
I simply want to make the point that the mere fact that material is
excluded from the consideration of the tribunal of fact is not in itself to
be regarded as inappropriate or improper. It is indeed, I would suggest,
one of the important functions of the criminal law to ensure that only
that material which is not excessively prejudicial is brought before the
court. We‘are all familiar with and accept those rules of evidence which
exclude the convictions of the accused. I would be the ﬁrst to spring to
the defence of that sort of rule. It would be entirely outrageous if the law
were to allow evidence to be adduced upon a trial of, say, burglary, that
the accused had been on previous occasions convicted of burglary or
break, enter and steal or armed robbery or whatever. It would be wrong
because inevitably the jury in those circumstances would say “Oh well,
he is just a burglar. Other juries have decided the same thing. We can feel
quite conﬁdent in convicting him”. That would be unfair and wrong. So
we all accept that sort of exclusion. I do not see that it is improper that we
should accept that sort of exclusion when it comes from the opposite
direction. The witnesses for the Crown ought, generally speaking, not be
subject to any particular protections, as I see it. However history and vast
experience of the criminal law in relation to sexual offences has
demonstrated, as Dr. Wright-Short said, that there has been particular
and gross abuse in relation to sexual assault trials. Accordingly the pro-
visions which are to be inserted in the Crimes Act, ss.409B and 409C, will
have the effect of limiting the scope of the material available for the jury
to look at.
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In my view, unless experience over the next year or so demonstrates
an error, I woul_d suggest that that exclusion has been made correctly.
I should say ﬁnally that I agree entirely with the approach taken by
the Australian Law Reform Commission in adopting an approach of
analysing the fundamentals of the law of criminal evidence. Thisis an
approach which His Honour Mr Justice Roden, in his numerous attacks
on deficiencies in the criminal law, has adopted. The truth is that good
ideas put down roots which may come up anywhere, and it may well be
that ideas put down by His Honour Mr Justice Roden tonight will come
up effectively in ﬁve or ten years time and that ideas put down by the
Australian Law Reform Commission will produce in ﬁve or ten years
time. I agree entirely with the general style of their approach.
Associate Professor R. P. Roulston, Deputy Director, Institute of
' Criminology
My former colleague Greg Woods has prompted me to rise to my
feet, which I normally do not do, and as he set one hare running irrel-
evant, I set another irrelvant hare running and direct it to the participants
or to whoever wants to respond.
What troubles me is the'existing availability of an unsworn state-
ment from the dock. I remain in favour of its retention myself but I know
there is a great division of opinion as to whether this statement untested
by cross-examination should be received as evidence or just a matter
which should be taken into consideration by the jury. It seems to me that
many juries, however directed, would regard it as a matter to be taken
into account on the same level as sworn evidence. It would appear to me
that many juries consider it in the same way as other evidence and give it
similar'weight as .the evidence that has been subjected to cross-examin-
ation. It may even be, as it has occurred, that some juries many regard the
fact that no cross-examination was made concerning it that it is undis-
puted and therefore place greater credence upon it than the sworn evi-
dence which has been subject to cross-examination. Perhaps some of the
panel or members of the audience 'may care to comment upon this
matter.
Mr Justice Roden
In reply to Greg Woods, my view is that the legislation to which he
referred would not have been necessary but for the fact that the law
preserved artiﬁcial rules of evidence which allowed the type of material
that is not to be excluded. It should have been excluded, without that
legislation, for the simple reason that it is irrelevant. If the principle of
primacy for the relevancy rule were applied, it will be seen that there has
been no justiﬁcation for many many years for cross-examination of a
could research this matter with the law of evidence for a very long time
indeed. It is hoped that by producing a draft proposal we will be able to
identify those areas where we should go further so I guess the answer is at
this stage that it is not intended to carry out that sort of research but we
are keeping that open until later.
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Stephen Norrish, Barrister-at-Law
I address my remarks towards His Honour Mr Justice Roden and
Mr Smith. In their very learned papers there is considerable attention
given to the question of reformulating the rules of evidence as they attach
to criminal matters — the very purpose of this seminar. But it appeared to
me in their papers that they seemed to hedge around a very important
area of the criminal law so far as evidence and the admissibility of
evidence is concerned and that is the area ofjudicial discretion. The area
of the judicial discretion is a matter of great concern to me as a practi-
tioner because my limited experience is that where the discretion is
exercised against the accused, and the majority of matters going to the
Court of Criminal Appeal involve accused persons appealing against
their convictions, Courts of Review are loath to interfere with the dis-
cretion exercised by the learned trial judge. Much of the attention in the
papers and the discussion has been towards the way in which the Tri-
bunal of Fact should reach conclusions governed by the particular rules
of evidence that are applicable. But surely, as we all know when dealing
particularly in criminal matters with juries, juries will reach particular
facts from the evidence given in circumstances sometimes where it may
be said that a judge has wrongly exercised his discretion, for example in
favour of the Crown as against the accused, and the jury has become
appraised of information which probative value may well be outweighed
by its prejudicial value. As a consequence the jury may come to a wrong
decision from the material placed before it.
No consideration has been given in either paper to those circum-
stances, bearing in mind as I said before that our Courts of Appeal, be
they our Court of Criminal Appeal or the High Court, when deciding on
appeals against conviction are loath to interfere with the exercise of the
discretion by the trial judge. I wonder if His Honour and Mr Smith might
direct their minds to the question of the judicial discretion, and particu-
larly whether there is a place for any judicial discretion in circumstances
where we have strictly formulated rules of evidence as proposed by the
speakers.
T. H. Smith
One thing we have, of course, considered is the use of discretion to
introduce ﬂexibility into the rules of evidence. I would like to reassure
the last speaker that it seems to me that if you go along that course you
have got to consider the limited nature of the right of appeal of the
appellant, be it the Crown or accused, against the exercise of the dis-
cretion. If the discretionary approach is to be adopted it seems to me that
one has to look into that question. I do not know what the answer would
be.
I suspect that your problemris a two fold one.
First of all the limited grounds upon which a Court of Appeal will
interfere in exercise of a trial judge’s discretion, and, secondly the provi-
so in a criminal appeal that notwithstanding that the Court of Criminal
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Appeal might decide that the discretion should not have been exercised.
the way it was, it may still decide that there was not a miscarriage of
justice. But we are alive to those problems.
I would like to ask Mr Woods a question. You mentioned keeping
the new reforms under observation. I am very interested in that remark
and l was just wondering how far in fact the new reforms will be
monitored?
G. D. Woods
The Criminal Law Review Division will monitor the new sexual
assault law reforms in association with the Bureau of Crime Statistics and
Research. We will communicate with all the other relevant parts of the
Attorney-General‘s Department at the grass roots level to ﬁnd out what is
happening; whether people are being convicted in circumstances when
they ought not to be. So we will in fact be keeping a very sharp eye on
whether or not the reforms are effective — statistically and also at the
level of contact with the actual practitioners.
I H. Smith
Are you able to say whether the fact that there would be a'monitor-
ing made the reforms easier to sell?
G. D. Woods
Undoubtedly without question. The fact that one could say or in-
' deed the Premier could say'and the Attorney could say as they did in
, Parliament, that these reforms would be the subject of monitoring and,
indeed; both the Attorney and the Premier committed themselves to
amendment of the law if in practice that monitoring were not working
properly. Indeed, that is obviously a point in favour of any legislation.
Garth Symonds. Barrister
I would like to suggest that there is one reform which above all
others would increase the standard of justice in the criminal justice sys-
tem in New South Wales, lower the cost, and generally improve the
elliciency of the criminal justice system, and that is the requirement that
no confession be admitted into evidence unless accompanied by a tape
recording ofthat confession where practicable to do so.
Could I just refer to information to support that contention. In the
Lucas Inquiry in Queensland in l977 the Public Defender estimated to
the Inquiry that the cost of disputes relating to the admission of con-
fessional evidence was in the vicinity of $1,000,000 per annum. He es-
timated that if tape recorders and videotaping were to be introduced1n
Queensland, videotapes to be used in the major towns and cities and tape
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recorders in other police stations, the costs would be in the vicinity of
$65,000. A recent study done at the end of 1979 in the District Court of
New South Wales where a researcher had a look at all trials and all pleas
over a period of six weeks showed that 50% of the time taken was occu-
pied in relation to disputes about the admissibility of confessional ma-
terial. I would ask Mr Smith in his research to take careful note of the
Beach Report and its recommendations and the fact that, as Mr Beach
pointed out, his study was one of the few studies which involved a
detailed look at many complaints which had been made to the Commis-
sion, and investigation of those complaints and his conclusions in rela-
tion to those complaints emanated'from practical experience with the
state of the criminal justice system in Victoria at that time. I think that is a
very important study because of that work, where some of the other
studies that have been done are not based so much on empirical work.
The Royal Commission Report on Criminal Procedure (1981) to
which Mr Smith refers included a research study on tape recording of
confessional material. The results of that study are in diametric contrast '
to the conclusions of the Lucas Inquiry and to the Beach Report. The
Royal Commission study found that only about 5% of time in criminal
trials was taken up contesting this sort of confessional evidence, and that
where experiments were done in tape recording confessions at police
stations it was found that the standard of recording was very bad and in
general that study was not as supportive of the concept of videotape or
tape recording confessions as were the Australian studies. The Beach
Report found in contrast, for example, that even in the acoustically worst
police stations acceptable tape recordings were made of confessions, and
both studies found that a much larger percentage of court time than ﬁve
percent was spent in testing the admissibility of confessional material.
T. H. Smith
In relation to the last speaker if I could just say this in ALRC 2, The
Criminal Investigations Report, the Commission did recommend tape
recording of interviews. We have, of course, yet to form a view on that in
this Reference. We will be considering that question.
In relation to the Royal Commission Report on Criminal Pro-
cedure, it did recommend that the police at the conclusion of an inter-
view record a summary of the interview and have the interviewee conﬁrm
the accuracy of that summary on the tape. So that it came in a limited
way towards meeting your ideas.
T. S. Davidson, Q.C., Deputy Senior Crown Prosecutor (Companies)
May I say a few brief, and in light of what is said in the papers and
what His Honour Judge Loveday has said, very timid words in defence of
the Hearsay Rule? It seems to me that if we adopt relevance as the sole
criterion for the consideration of material as legal evidence then we move
on what I conceive to be a fallacy, and that fallacy is that the more
material you have before the fact-ﬁnding tribunal of necessity the more
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likely you are to reach a “maximization of the truth” which is the phrase
' used by His Honour Mr Justice Roden. In fact, as I understand it, in
other fields of endeavour than the law experience has proved the oppo-
site because, though I am neither an historian nor‘ a scientist, those
disciplines devise tests and procedures for limiting that which may be
considered as material to support a valid judgement. It seems to me that
the legal rules relating to admissibility of evidence perform a similar
function. They seek to achieve a valid ultimate judgement by limiting the
material which the tribunal has to consider and in doing so. it follows
these other disciplines.
Now one of» those rules is the Hearsay Rule and what itsays in its
simplest form is that what X said to Y out of court, X not being a witness,
is not to be received as legal evidence of the truth of what X said. It seems
to me, with respect to those who hold the opposite view, that if one
assumes, as our system of justiCe assumes, that in order to be legal evi-
dence someone must afﬁrm a statement of fact either on oath or on
afﬁrmation and must make himself available for testing of his statement.
by cross examination, then that is an entirely reasonable rule ofexclusion
to have. Although it is and has been over the years subjected to many and
varied exceptions, with respect again to those who criticize it on that
basis, it seems to me that one cannot effectively criticize a rule of law .
because it is subject to exceptions. That is the way that the law works. The
more that a rule is subjected to‘ examination in litigation and in academic
studies the more exceptions and subrexceptions, sub-sub-exceptions and ’
sub-rules'we will expect to ﬁnd in relation to it, but that does not really
affect the vital element. The essential element is the rule itself, and the
essential element it seems to me in hearsay is that it prevents from being
treated as evidence, even though it be relevant, that which is not affirmed
either on oath or byaf‘ﬁrmation and is not capable of being tested be-
cause the person who perceived the alleged fact is not brought into court.
Now, it is true that that leads to inconvenient and, indeed, sometimes
absurd results. It certainly leads to inconvenience and troublesome re-
sults in cases like the Sparks case and” perhaps the answer for that is, as I
believe Mr Justice Roden suggested, to treat the victim as a party. But
certainly it seems to those of us who meet that type of case from time to
time that some such exception ought to be added to the rule to meet that
type of case.
The Jones v Metcalfe case is entirely consistent with the rule against
hearsay. The perception of the perceiver had to be excluded because all
that could logically be said by the writer of the message was that he heard
something —- he did not see the car number. He'could not depose to what
the car number really was, all he could depose to was havingheard what
sOmebody else said he saw. Fortunately, perhaps again'from the point of
view of convenience, the High Court may havefound a way around that
particular situation it would seem (although I have not read the judgment
in Alexander.s case) by treating the transaction as a whole.
So we get another development of the law, anbther exception to the
rule against hearsay, but it dOes not, I would venture to suggest affect the
essential validity of the ruleas a sensible rule for the exclusion of ma-
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terial which although relevant would not help to reach an evaluation of
the truth based on reasonably trustworthy material.
Sgt. 0. Taylor, NSW Police Prosecuting Branch
Mr Smith said that the right to silence is fundamental and not open
to debate. I hope he said that as a statement and not as a direction to me.
We do have in our Evidence Act 5.9 that does make provision for the right
to silence for the people who are accused of a crime. I do hope that the
Law Reform Commission will consider this as a matter that might be
looked into particularly with the abundance of legal aid that is available
today, and particularly with the propriety of our judiciary, be they Su-
preme Court judges or be they magistrates. One would expect that if
cooperation were consistent with innocence then an accused person
would be quick to cooperate and provide an answer. Surely if a person
totally innocent of a crime is spoken to by a member of the police service
and an allegation is put to him, if he Were innocent he could not be shut
up. If he is guilty he will seek to hide behind provisions of 59. HI fail in
my attempt to have the Law Reform Commission look at the hideaway
that is open to persons accused of crimes then could an alternative be
provided that that man’s silence be the subject to criticism by the ju-
diciary.
Mary Elliott, Senior Research Assistant, Institute of Criminology.
I have also done some work on legal history, and I would just like
to add a small historical note on the right to silence. It used to be called
“standing mute”, and there is a lot of history behind allowing people to
“stand mute”. The penalty for doing so in the 17th century was peineforte
et dure which meant that a defendant refusing to plead guilty or not
guilty was pressed under a board for three days and given just water and
bread until he or she agreed to plead. If the person insisted on remaining
mute the penalty was continued until death ensued. I think we have come
a long way from those days. I think the right to silence is quite important
in the Common Law system.
Chairman
It might be appropriate at this stage, seeing that so many people are
anxious that the Law Reform Commission should do this and do that, to
ask the question of the Law Reform Commission representative here
whether the Commission is likely to examine the question of the extent to
which people ensure that they are convicted by exercising the right to
silence or refraining from going into the witness box and making a
statement from the dock? This question as I understand it has never been
looked at. I believe myself, as a judge of many years, that in certain cases
the course adopted by the accused on his interrogation by the police, the
fact that he has refused to speak, the fact that he refuses and refrains from
going into the witness box, operates as the most cogent piece of evidence
against him, and obviously merits I think some consideration by the Law
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Reform Commission to ensure that people are not unjustly convicted by
exercising their rights.
T. H. Smith
The present position of the Commission is that the evidence avail-
able, which is summarised in the paper, does not support a change of the
traditional view ofthe trial and that view includes the proposition that no
inferences should be drawn from the right to silence. What is proposed is .
that we prepare a draft proposal and in the light of the response to that
embark upon further empirical research. One of the problems that we
face ,with this sort of Reference is that you could devise empirical re-
search on every topic if you wanted to. One could research eachmatter
with the law of evidence for a very long time indeed. It is hoped that by
producing a draft proposal we will be able to identity those areas where
we should go further. So I suppose the answer is that, at this stage, it is
not intended 'to carry out that sort of research but we are keeping the
matter open for consideration later. ' '
' His Honour Judge J. K. Ford, a Judge of the District Court of N.S.W.
May I ask His Honour, Mr Justice Roden, whether when he was
writing paragraphs 76 and 77 of his paper he was using the macro or the
microscope? I suspect that His Honour may have been using the
macroscope because it seems to me, with respect, that the material there
is written with little or no regard for a strong body of authority which
exists in the High Court and also in the Court of Criminal Appeal in New
South Wales. I had thought, in my innocence, that in that forties Sir
Kenneth Street, who was then one of the Senior Puisne Judges in the
Court of Criminal Appeal had said very plainly that a police ofﬁcer is
entitled to question a person in custody, but a police officer is not entitled
to become oppressive and so on. I express that somewhat compendious-
ly, I agree. Then subsequently, of course, in McDermott Chief Justice'
Latham and Sir Owen Dixon both agreed as I remember with that prop-
osition stated by Sir Kenneth Street in Jeﬂries' case (1946) 47 S.R. 284.
There are some other cases as well — McDermott (No.2) 1947 (47 SR.
407) and Jeﬂries (supra) are the two in the Court of Criminal Appeal and
in the High Court thereIS McDermott v The King (1948) 76 C. L. R. SCI
and R. v Marley(l932) 47 C. L. R. 618.
If it is intended to suggest that it is wrong for a police ofﬁcer to
question an accused person or a suspected person in custody, and that
evidence of such questioning is inadmissible by reason of the.person
being in custody without an added element of unfairness or oppression,
then it does seem to me, with respect, that that proposition is in conﬂict
with that strong body of law which I have mentioned so very brieﬂy.
Chris Ronalds. Anti-Discrimination Board, N.S.W.
I understand the 1980 Police Association Conference recom-
mended that in respect of internal disciplinary enquiries into police be-
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haviour there would be ﬁrstly a right to silence, and secondly all interro-
gations be tape recorded or there be an independent person present. I
would like to ask Sgt. Taylor why, if it is good enough for the police, it is
not good enough for ordinary citizens?
Sergeant 0. Taylor
I do not know if I am being “verballed”. I have been given notice of
the question and I will answer it later. '
Mr Justice Roden ‘
In reply to His Honour Judge Ford: In writing pragraphs 76 and 77
I did not contemplate for a moment that I was giving the impression that
I believed that there was no right to question a person already in custody.
Having reread those paragraphs I am equally certain that I did not, in
fact, even inadvertantly say so. What I was dealingwith in those para-'
graphs was the position of a person who is unlawfully held. What Sir
Kenneth Street had to say about the position concerning a person in
custody was a reference to a person who was lawfully held, and, as I
understand the law of this State, that means who has been arrested. I was
dealing with the position in paragraphs 76 and 77 of a person who is not
under arrest, in respect of whom the police have insufﬁcient material to
justify an arrest, but who has been issued a very kind invitation to accom-
pany one of Sergeant Taylor’s colleagues to the police station and when
there is asked questions. The point I seek to make is this. If there has been
improper compulsion in the taking of the person to the police station, it
may be a little unrealistic to determine the voluntariness of what goes on
there merely by questioning whether his arm was twisted once he had
arrived. I have suggested that regard might be had to the manner in
which a person is brought into the interview situation in deciding the
voluntariness of any confession that is then made.
The other material that I think I should reply to is that which came
from Mr Smith in the opening remarks with which he presented his
paper. He said, as I recall it, that it might be easier to live with the type of
artiﬁciality that I ﬁnd it very hard to live with if primacy were given to
the importance of ensuring that the innocent were protected against
wrongful conviction. The suggestion was that the Hearsay Rule might be
more acceptable if one put at the top of one's priorities the rule that you
must see the innocent are not convicted. I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to see how that
can explain and justify the retention of the Hearsay Rule that caused Mr
Sparks and Mr Thomson to be convicted when hearsay material that
might have assisted them was excluded. As for the Jones v Metcalfe type
of case Mr Smith said the ear plays tricks so that it might be quite sound
to say that when A sees an event and tells B what A saw, B ought not be
allowed to repeat it in court; he might have misheard A. What then of the
informal admission or confession of which evidence is given? The wit-
ness says: “I heard the accused say: ‘Yes I did it’ ”. Does the law then say
the ear plays tricks — you cannot admit that sort of evidence?
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The same principle Mr Smith suggested justiﬁes excluding con-
sideration ol the co-accused5 statement in ajoint trial. IfA says: “Yes, I
did it, and B was in it, too”, it is not fair, Mr Smith says, to consider that
as evidence against B. What, as I query in the paper, is the position if at a
joint trial the evidence is that in his statement to the police A said: “Yes, I
did it, and there was somebody in it with me, but it wasn’t B”? Does Mr
Smith say it is in the interests of protecting B against a wrongful convic-
tion not to allow him to have the beneﬁt of that statement because the
Hearsay Rule says he cannot have it? What happens, of course, is that we
get these rules, and we adhere to them because we always had them. The
fact that the ear plays tricks will be used to justify the Hearsay Rule but
will be forgotten when it might equally be used in another situation.
What I fear with these technical rules, which are explained to juries who
are not equipped to deal with them, 'is what was said by people who
should know what they are talking about on the English Criminal Law
Revision Committee, as I mentioned in paragraph '54, with relation to the
non-use of one accused’s statement in the trial of the other. After reciting
the direction that has to be given, the Committee goes on “This is a
subtlety which must be confusing to juries, and in reality they will inevi-
tably take the statement into account against both accused”. Now isn’t
that really the sort of position we have to face up to? Do we think that
our consciences are clear because in' glorious legalese we have recited to
juries the rules that we have devised, leaving them to make the best they ‘
can of the totality of the evidence that they have, with no guarantee that
they will apply the rules that we have told them of, indeed no guarantee
that they even understand them? So I do think the problem isn’t whether
you appreciate the importance of protecting the innocent against the
possibility of wrongful conviction, the problem, I think, is whether you
appreciate the distinction between the function of a rule of evidence and
the function of your tribunal of fact.
The law of evidence is a very blunt instrument. You may devise the
best possible set of rules, and that will be the one that does the least
injustice. I question whether that is good enough and whether we ought
not to trust a little more in the icommonsense of juries and place less
reliance on the ability of lawyers to devise rules that will set them and
keep them on the proper course. ‘ ' '
'I‘. H. Smith
I would like to thank those who offered their thoughts at this sem-
inar, and I would ask them to bear in mind our interest in the subject of
. evidence If any issues come to light which you think require attention
and reforms you think should be considered we would be very grateful if
you would let us know.
I particularly address my remarks to Sergeant Taylor. We are very,
concerned to get submissions from the Police Force on this reference. In
speaking as I did about the right to silence I was not trying to say that it
was something that could not or should not be reviewed. My point was
that if you accept the traditional view of the criminal trial it is difﬁcult to
do anything to the right to silence. My point was that it raises a very
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fundamental question and one has to look at the evidence to determine
whether that right is something that should continue or not. But if the
evidence is there we will take account of it and those interested in that
topic may be interested to'look into that further and produce some
evidence. ‘ ‘
Might I. by way of defence to Mr 'Justice Roden say that I may not
have made myself terribly clear in talking about the problem of what
weight do you give to the proposition that we minimise or should mini-
mise the risk of convicting the innocent. It is something that in the
hearsay context works differently depending upon whether you are look-
ing at the evidenceJed by. the Crown and the evidence led by the accused.
Towards the end of my remarks I did try to make the point that this
principle lay behind the distinction drawn in the paper on that topic. For
instance in the Sparks and Thompson situations, if we apply that prin-
ciple we should be very concerned that that sort of hearsay is not admit-
ted. On the other hand by the same token one may be very concerned at
the prospect of an accused person being convicted on hearsay evidence.
It seems to me that the concern to minimise the risk of convicting the
innocent may justify the continuation of the Hearsay Rule in relation to
evidence led by the Crown. It may at the same time require reconsidera-
tion of the Hearsay Rule so far as evidence led by the accused is con-
cerned. '
If we do take the'a'ﬁﬁr'aé‘éh that we do not give these admittedly
artiﬁcial directions to the jury and leave it to the jury’s commonsense,- is
that where we leave the matter or do we try in some other way to bring to
the jury’s attention the risks and the hazards in such evidence? It seems to
me that one cannot simply solve the problem by abolishing the rules
which give rise to these directions. The problem is the jury does have to
weigh the evidence. The question is, as I see it, what guidance and help
do you give the body of laymen in handling that evidence? At the mo-
ment we use directions, which I agree with His Honour can be artiﬁcial,
can be very complicated, and His Honour has referred to the area of
corroboration. But if you withdraw them, what happens? It may be that
one justiﬁes the directions on the basis that one can but try to ensure that
an innocent accused person is not convicted by going through this tortu-
ous process. It may be that some juries may be able to cope with them, it
may be that some won’t. If some have coped, then perhaps we have done
the best we can in a difﬁcult situation.
N. S. Raeburn
I have just two comments that I would like to make on items that
arise out of the discussion. It may well be that English courts only spend
5% of their time looking at matters relating to the admissibility of con-
fessions, and that courts in Queensland spend 50% of their time. It may
be that this reﬂects nothing more than thefact that our two countries look
differently on our police ofﬁcers — this is well known and well estab-
lished. But I have no doubt that ultimately technology will overtake the
question of the taking of confessions whether it is tape recording,
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whether it is videotape, whether it is some combination of techniques that'
we know nothing about. Ultimately it will' come, and it-will come not
‘ necessarily because it is a fairer way of doing what is presently being
done, but simply because the parties will have become so distanced from
each other that only some scientiﬁc technical objective method will be
capable of drawing them back together again.
The second point that I wanted to; comment on out of discussion is
something that was put to us by our learned Chairman. We all know that
the dock statement exists as a kind of left-over from a 19th century .
historical process. But I had always thought in my innocence that we
defended it- nowadays on the grounds that it was the only way that the
honest,‘,but simple and Wrongly accused, person'could‘ put his side of the
story without becoming ensnared by wicked lawyers; and I’ was horriﬁed
to hear our Chairman say it was a sure path to conviction. But it "does
make one point about the nature of human activity. We plan and we
scheme and we produce brilliant constructs, and we use them and they
"have the result exactly opposite tothe result we intended. That constantly
happens in all areas of life, and I see absolutely. no reason 'why law
reform should beimmune.
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